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ABSTRACT 
In recent years, a troubling trend has emerged within a number of 
poor, black communities.  Termed “Stop Snitching,” it has manifested 
itself in the form of community members’ refusing to cooperate with 
police investigations of community crimes.  The result of this 
widespread refusal to cooperate has been a reduced number of crimes 
solved within these communities; without cooperating witnesses, it 
has proven exceedingly difficult for police to make criminal cases. 
Reactions to Stop Snitching have taken two predominant forms, 
both of which are mistaken. The first, most often attributed to law 
enforcement officers, is contempt. To officers and the like-minded, 
community members who do not assist in criminal investigations are 
violating the ethical obligation all citizens have to aid in the arrest and 
prosecution of criminal actors.  The second reaction to Stop 
Snitching, most often coming from citizens largely isolated from 
poor, black communities, is confusion.  Assuming the police to be 
allies of the citizenry, such individuals wonder why anyone would 
even entertain the notion of refusing to help the police solve 
community crimes. 
This Article suggests a different understanding of Stop Snitching, 
arguing that poor, black community members’ refusal to cooperate 
with police investigations should be viewed as neither ethically 
condemnable nor inexplicable, but rather as a natural extension of the 
innate human aspiration to be loyal.  It does so by situating Stop 
Snitching within the existing literature on loyalty and asserting that 
the refusal to cooperate with police represents a privileging of 
community loyalty over loyalty to the state.  Throughout the various 
strata of contemporary society, such privileging of the familiar over 
the remote is common, and Stop Snitching is neither puzzling nor 
reprehensible when viewed as a manifestation of this manner of 
prioritization. 
Once Stop Snitching is understood as a reflection of the weak 
loyalty bonds that exist between police officers and the poor, black 
communities they serve, it becomes clear that it can be curtailed and 
ultimately eliminated only through police efforts aimed at 
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strengthening these bonds.  This Article closes with a discussion of 
the steps police should take in order to succeed in this regard.  
INTRODUCTION 
Two things we must never do: never lie, never tattle.1 
–General Douglas MacArthur 
pon leaving his home on February 4, 2006, Israel “Izzy” 
Ramirez, a cheerful, twenty-nine-year-old father of three, could 
not have known that he would never return.2  A bodyguard by trade, 
Izzy set out that day to work for rapper Trevor Smith, better known 
by his stage name, Busta Rhymes.3  Smith was to star in a music 
video being filmed that night and, having been robbed in the past, 
tasked Izzy with guarding his jewelry.4 
The video shoot took place at the Kiss the Cactus soundstage in the 
Greenpoint section of Brooklyn, New York.5  As many as five 
hundred people arrived at Kiss the Cactus that night, including a 
number of popular musicians.6  Though details are hazy, at some 
point it fell to Izzy to assist with expelling a rival rapper and his 
entourage from the premises.  As the dispute spilled into the Brooklyn 
streets, an unidentified party shot Izzy in the chest.7  He would never 
see his family again. 
Police arriving on the scene received little witness cooperation.  
Though an estimated crowd of seventy-five witnessed the shooting, 
none would finger Izzy’s killer.8  Police believed that Smith was 
standing next to Izzy when he was shot and were confident that Smith 
could identify the shooter.9  And yet he too refused to cooperate.10  
 
1 DOUGLAS MACARTHUR, REMINISCENCES: GENERAL OF THE ARMY 15 (1964). 
2 Ian Frazier, The Rap: Keeping Hip-Hop Safe from Crime, NEW YORKER, Dec. 8, 
2008, at 72, 78. 
3 Andrew Jacobs, Commissioner Chides Rapper for Silence in Guard’s Killing, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 16, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/16/nyregion/16rap.html. 
4 Frazier, supra note 2; Lisa Muñoz & Alison Gendar, Rhymes Has a Reason, N.Y. 
DAILY NEWS, Feb. 7, 2006, http://www.nydailynews.com/archives/news/2006/02/07 
/2006-02-07_rhymes_has_a_reason_.html. 
5 Kati Cornell Smith et al., A Rhymes or Reason: Probers Eye Fifty Pals in Video Shoot, 
N.Y. POST, Feb. 7, 2006, at 6. 
6 Jacobs, supra note 3.  Celebrities in attendance included rappers 50 Cent and Missy 
Elliott, as well as singer Mary J. Blige.  Id. 
7 Frazier, supra note 2, at 78. 
8 Id.; Smith et al., supra note 5, at 6. 
9 Muñoz & Gendar, supra note 4. 
U
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By August, police had conducted nearly one hundred interviews in an 
effort to solve Izzy’s murder; none led to a suspect.11 
The unresolved murder of Izzy Ramirez illustrates a practice that 
has, in recent years, become increasingly common in a number of 
urban communities: the blanket refusal to cooperate with police.  
Though criminal organizations have long nurtured an ethos 
condemning cooperation with law enforcement, the arrival of this 
norm among ordinary, noncriminal citizens—such as the dozens who 
witnessed Ramirez’s murder—is a recent trend.  Nonetheless, since 
its emergence in popular culture in 2004, the so-called Stop Snitching 
phenomenon has quickly spread from coast to coast and shows few 
signs of abating. 
Public reactions to Stop Snitching have generally fallen into two 
categories: contempt and confusion.  For some, particularly those in 
law enforcement, Stop Snitching raises significant ethical issues 
arising out of the belief that cooperating with police is part and parcel 
of one’s civic duty.12  The logic goes something like this: because 
most of us accept the general proposition that crime is bad, it is the 
duty of every citizen to assist law enforcement in catching and 
punishing criminals.13  Deciding whether to cooperate with law 
enforcement thus enters into the realm of individual ethics: To 
cooperate with the police is good (or right) and to refuse to cooperate 
with the police is bad (or wrong).  Once this simple dichotomy is 
established, the refusal to cooperate serves as a basis for ethical 
condemnation.14  Regarding Smith’s refusal to reveal Izzy’s killer, for 
 
10 Jacobs, supra note 3. 
11 Emily Vasquez, Rapper Silent About Aide’s Death, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2006, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/22/nyregion/22busta.html.  Ramirez’s murder remains 
unsolved.  Id. 
12 See ETHAN BROWN, SNITCH: INFORMANTS, COOPERATORS AND THE CORRUPTION 
OF JUSTICE 10 (2007) (“Law enforcement, unsurprisingly, became increasingly concerned 
about the prevalence of the ‘Stop Snitchin’’ phenomenon, which they viewed as a middle 
finger to cops or, worse, witness intimidation in a T-shirt.”).  Brown’s reference is to the 
infamous “Stop Snitchin’” T-shirts that became a concomitant expressive vehicle for those 
ascribing to anti-cooperation norms as the phenomenon first began to arise.  See infra note 
28 and accompanying text (discussing Stop Snitching T-shirts). 
13 NYPD Commissioner Raymond Kelly noted that, because Smith is among the class 
of wealthy artists, his duty to assist with the NYPD’s investigation is particularly 
pronounced: “[T]hese hip-hop artists are making a lot of money.  You'd like to think that 
there’s some sort of civil responsibility that goes along with that.  But apparently there 
isn’t.”  Andrew Jacobs, When Rappers Keep Their Mouths Shut Tight, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
19, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/19/nyregion/19busta.html. 
14 Press accounts relating to Stop Snitching have condemned it, and those who refuse to 
cooperate with the authorities, in no uncertain terms.  See, e.g., Leonard Pitts, Jr., Seeing 
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example, one exasperated NYPD detective declared, “If Busta saw 
who killed his bodyguard, he should come forward, because it’s right 
. . . .  There’s a principle involved here.  Busta should come forward 
because it’s right.”15  Echoing this sentiment, NYPD Commissioner 
Raymond Kelly added in connection with the murder, “No one has 
come forward, no one has volunteered to be questioned in the matter  
. . . .  I find it quite frankly, quite disturbing.”16 
To those not involved in law enforcement, on the other hand, Stop 
Snitching has proven more puzzling than ethically troublesome.  As 
Alexandra Natapoff—whose research in recent years has focused on 
various aspects of snitching17—has observed, “Mainstream media and 
its consumers . . . often have difficulty understanding urban 
perceptions of ‘stop snitching,’ finding inexplicable the idea that law-
abiding people might resist cooperating with the police.”18  In the 
minds of such individuals, refusing to help the police solve crimes 
simply defies logic; absent an imminent or likely threat,19 they 
 
Weakness and Cowardice in Miami Park, HOUS. CHRON., Feb. 9, 2009, http://www 
.chron.com/CDA/archives/archive.mpl?id=2009_4699067 (describing “the so-called stop 
snitching culture” as being “as weak and cowardly as it gets”); Editorial, Protecting 
Witnesses, BALT. SUN, Mar. 29, 2009, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2009-03-29/news 
/0903270125_1_witness-intimidation-victims-and-witnesses-securing-justice (declaring 
that “the ‘stop snitching’ culture [is a] serious threat to securing justice for crime victims 
across the country”); Jessica Van Sack, No-Snitchin’ Creed Stymies Cops’ Probe, BOS. 
HERALD, Jan. 19, 2009, at 17 (blaming the “reviled stop-snitching culture” for inhibiting 
an investigation).  The Reverend Al Sharpton has weighed in as well, launching a national 
“anti-stop-snitching” campaign, and declaring to those who refuse to cooperate: “‘You are 
traitors to our race and denigrating our community.’”  Pitts, supra. 
15 Frazier, supra note 2, at 78. 
16 Jacobs, supra note 3. 
17 See, e.g., Alexandra Natapoff, Beyond Unreliable: How Snitches Contribute to 
Wrongful Convictions, 37 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 107 (2006); Alexandra Natapoff, 
Deregulating Guilt: The Information Culture of the Criminal System, 30 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 965 (2008); Alexandra Natapoff, Snitching: The Institutional and Communal 
Consequences, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 645 (2004). 
18 ALEXANDRA NATAPOFF, SNITCHING: CRIMINAL INFORMANTS AND THE EROSION OF 
AMERICAN JUSTICE 132–33 (2009); see also Tony Norman, Editorial, “Code of Street” 
Needs Big Morality Boost, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, May 4, 2007, http://www.post     
-gazette.com/pg/07124/783280-153.stm (wondering why “any rational person would 
refuse to help authorities locate” some criminals). 
19 Though safety is certainly a concern for many, assessing what motivates those who 
refuse to cooperate cannot end there.  As one Department of Justice report notes, 
“Examples of mass intimidation given by police and prosecutors . . . suggest that fear is 
only one factor contributing to the reluctance of witnesses to step forward; strong 
community ties and a deep-seated distrust of law enforcement may also be strong 
deterrents to cooperation.”  KERRY MURPHY HEALEY, NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, VICTIM AND WITNESS INTIMIDATION: NEW DEVELOPMENTS AND 
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wonder, why would any law-abiding citizen ever not desire to help 
the police remove a criminal from the streets? 
In answering this question, this Article seeks to recontextualize 
Stop Snitching by showing that the refusal to cooperate with law 
enforcement officers by members of certain communities should be 
understood as neither inexplicable nor evidence of an ethical 
shortcoming, as it is most often perceived, but rather as a natural 
extension of the innate human desire to be loyal.  Loyalty has 
historically been among the most cherished of attributes, and the 
violation of loyalty—betrayal—has consistently been condemned 
across cultures.  In modern society, individuals have numerous 
loyalties—to people, groups, and principles, and when they can exist 
harmoniously, having numerous loyalties poses no significant hurdle.  
One can be loyal to one’s fellow union members during the day, for 
example, and loyal to one’s family at night and on weekends.  But 
when loyalties conflict, one must privilege one in reaching a 
resolution—loyalty to one necessarily requires disloyalty to the other. 
Regardless of a witness’s motivation, cooperating with the police 
can be read as an act of loyalty to the state, for it is an affirmative step 
taken in furtherance of the state’s objective of bringing criminals to 
justice.  Refusing to cooperate, on the other hand, can be read as an 
act of disloyalty, as an illustration of the fact that the state is not the 
locus of the witness’s sole or primary loyalty.  A witness who refuses 
to cooperate with the police privileges a separate loyalty over loyalty 
to the state,20 and this Article argues that, in the poor, black 
communities in which it is most prominent, Stop Snitching can be 
read as a privileging of community loyalty.21  There is a fundamental 
disconnect between these communities and the police, and Stop 
Snitching represents the culmination of the historical uneasiness that 
has existed between them, an uneasiness that persists today and plays 
 
EMERGING RESPONSES 2 (1995), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov /pdffiles/witintim.pdf.  
Given the existence of confidential tip lines and means of conveying information other 
than face-to-face interaction with a uniformed officer, fear for one’s safety cannot fully 
account for why so many ordinary (noncriminal) citizens refuse to assist with police 
investigations. 
20 For example, a father who has witnessed his daughter stealing an expensive necklace 
from a department store would in most cases be unlikely to cooperate with police 
investigating the crime or assist in her prosecution.  His loyalty to his daughter would, 
thus, be given primacy over his loyalty to the state. 
21 This is not to say, of course, that members of these communities are disloyal to the 
state, but merely that their act of disloyalty—refusing to cooperate with police—can be 
read as privileging their community loyalty over their state loyalty.  In this regard, refusing 
to cooperate with the police is akin to the example in note 20. 
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a pivotal role in deterring witnesses from helping the police solve 
crimes.  Analyzing Stop Snitching against the backdrop of the 
literature on loyalty offers an alternative account of what motivates 
many of those who refuse to cooperate with the police and suggests 
steps police can take in order to more effectively encourage witness 
cooperation.22 
This Article proceeds in four Parts.  Part I discusses the origins of 
Stop Snitching, tracing its roots to a homemade DVD that was 
produced in Baltimore in 2004.  It then examines recent scholarship 
on snitching, noting that much of it relates to real-life prisoner’s 
dilemmas, that is, scenarios in which an individual in state custody 
must decide whether or not to defect in order to receive a reduced 
criminal punishment.  Though this literature is not unrelated to Stop 
Snitching, there is a meaningful distinction between the motivations 
of a potential cooperating witness who is currently in police custody 
and those of one who is not.  It is this latter group’s motivations with 
which this Article is primarily concerned.  Part II examines literature 
on loyalty arising out of a number of fields in order to illustrate the 
diverse array of relationships that can be cast in terms of loyalty.  A 
consistent theme of this Part is the manner in which one’s loyalty to 
one person or group of people (for example, one’s peers) can be 
tested only when it is in tension with another of one’s loyalties (for 
example, one’s principles), and the studies cited show that individuals 
tend to privilege loyalty to individuals with whom, or groups with 
which, they interact regularly over loyalty to more remote individuals 
or principles. 
Part III assesses Stop Snitching through the loyalty lens.  It argues 
that, upon witnessing a crime within one’s community, one frequently 
faces a conflict of loyalties: to one’s community and its members, on 
the one hand, and to the state, on the other.  This clash of loyalties is 
hardest to resolve when one is from a socially and economically 
 
22 To be sure, there are numerous reasons that could explain one’s refusal to cooperate 
with police other than an ethical void or a sense of loyalty, fear for one’s safety being chief 
among them.  One oft-cited example of the type of witness intimidation that takes place in 
some communities is the case of Angela Dawson, a Baltimore resident who decided to 
report drug activity in her neighborhood.  See, e.g., A Tragic Symbol; '00 to '09, BALT. 
SUN, Dec. 27, 2009, at A13.  In retaliation, a local man poured gasoline on her home in the 
middle of the night and lit it on fire.  Id.  Dawson, her husband, and five children perished 
in the blaze.  Id.  Though tragedies such as Dawson’s have rendered fear of retaliation an 
underlying cause of the refusal to cooperate in some communities, fear of retaliation 
cannot alone account for the pervasiveness of the depth and breadth of Stop Snitching.  
See HEALEY, supra note 19, at 2 (noting “that fear is only one factor contributing to the 
reluctance of witnesses to step forward”). 
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isolated community that has an uneasy relationship with the police 
(the agents of the state seeking cooperation), such as the communities 
in which Stop Snitching is most prominent.  Although solutions to 
this conflict vary based on individual and communal circumstances, 
the primary objective of Part III is to show that deciding not to 
cooperate can be a reasonable choice representing the privileging of 
one loyalty over another, the result of a calculus not unlike those 
described in Part II.  Borrowing from the literature on community 
policing, Part IV suggests strategies police might employ to foster an 
increased sense of loyalty to the state among residents of poor, black 
communities—thereby increasing the rate of witness cooperation—
and makes the case that such a measure could quickly succeed if 
implemented with Stop Snitching in mind. 
I 
WHEN WITNESSES REFUSE TO COOPERATE 
This Part first examines the origins of Stop Snitching.  Though it 
initially arose out of the timeless tradition of criminals’ refusing to 
implicate other criminals, Stop Snitching has evolved in such a way 
that now noncriminals in many communities are unwilling to 
cooperate with police investigations, even in the aid of solving violent 
crimes.  This Part next describes existing literature on snitching in 
order to show that much of it is concerned primarily with in-custody 
or criminal witnesses rather than ordinary citizens who have 
witnessed crimes.  Using this literature as a point of departure, this 
Part then hones in on the specific type of refusal to cooperate with 
law enforcement that is the concern of this Article, namely that of 
“civilians” who have no immediately discernable reason to withhold 
helpful investigative information. 
A.  Stop Snitching’s Humble Baltimore Origins 
The ascent of Stop Snitching can be traced to a single low-budget 
DVD produced by Rodney Bethea, a Baltimore barber and 
entrepreneur, in 2004.  The DVD—titled Stop Fucking Snitching, Vol. 
1—stars Rodney Thomas, who, in a turn worthy of Virgil, leads his 
audience on a whirlwind tour through some of Charm City’s meanest 
streets.  Thomas introduces the audience to a series of Baltimore’s 
“gun-toting, marijuana-smoking denizens who angrily lament the 
prevalence of informants and cooperators in their communities and 
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threaten the ‘rats,’ ‘bitches,’ and ‘snitches’ with violent retribution.”23  
Though general antipathy toward informants is the primary theme of 
Stop Snitching, Thomas also names specific cooperators over the 
course of the DVD’s 108 minutes.24 
Notwithstanding its provocative content, Stop Snitching likely 
would not have had any impact beyond a few neighborhoods in 
Baltimore but for the fact that NBA superstar Carmelo Anthony, who 
grew up in Baltimore, makes a brief appearance in the film.25  The 
combination of Anthony’s celebrity and the film’s subversive 
message turned Stop Snitching into a sensation.26  The national media 
quickly picked up the story,27 and Stop Snitching achieved a level of 
infamy neither Bethea nor Thomas could have predicted. 
Concurrent with the DVD’s growing national profile, Stop 
Snitching T-shirts began to appear in stores and on the streets, first in 
Baltimore, then in cities throughout the country.  The shirts, most 
often featuring a stop sign and containing the words “Stop Snitching,” 
became a brief fashion craze,28 further popularizing the anti-
cooperation message of Bethea’s film.  The perceived message of the 
DVD and T-shirts was that all forms of cooperation with the police, 
including that of witnesses to crimes and even family members of 
victims, should cease.29  As Richard Delgado has noted, abiding by 
this perceived message “is rapidly becoming a social norm,” as it 
relates to crimes both minor (such as drug possession) and major 
(such as homicide).30  This fledgling social norm has had a 
meaningful effect, as Delgado has observed: “In some neighborhoods, 
 
23 BROWN, supra note 12, at 170.  As one might expect, Thomas’s tone is coarse and 
confrontational throughout Stop Snitching.  In one oft-quoted scene he notes, “‘To all you 
rats and snitches lucky enough to cop one of these DVDs, I hope you catch AIDS in your 
mouth and your lips are the first thing to die.’”  Id. at 170–71; see also Jeremy Kahn, The 
Story of a Snitch, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Apr. 2007, at 80, 86 (quoting the same sentence). 
24 BROWN, supra note 12, at 171. 
25 Kahn, supra note 23, at 86.  Anthony appears in only six of Stop Snitching’s 108 
minutes.  Id.; see also PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE: A HIP-HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE 87 
(2009) (noting that the “DVD’s main claim to fame was a cameo by the superstar 
basketball player Carmelo Anthony, who grew up in Baltimore”). 
26 Kahn, supra note 23, at 86. 
27 NATAPOFF, supra note 18, at 122. 
28 BROWN, supra note 12, at 172–73; see also BUTLER, supra note 25, at 87 (describing 
Stop Snitching–related T-shirts as “the height of fashion for African American teenagers 
in Baltimore” “[f]or a few months in 2005”). 
29 Richard Delgado, Law Enforcement in Subordinated Communities: Innovation and 
Response, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1193, 1205 (2008) (book review). 
30 Id. 
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because of the unwillingness of witnesses to come forward, the 
[homicide] ‘clearance rate’ is much lower [than the sixty percent 
national average].”31 
For his part, Bethea, Stop Snitching’s producer, claims that these 
consequences are the result of an unfortunate misreading of his 
documentary.  “‘When we refer to snitches,’” Bethea has said, “‘we 
are referring to a person engaging and profiting from illegal activities.  
And when they get arrested, to save themselves, they tell on everyone 
else they know.  No one likes that.’”32  He continued, “‘That is 
considered a snitch.  The old lady that lives on the block that call the 
police because guys are selling drugs in front of her house, she’s not a 
snitch, because she is what would be considered a civilian.’”33  To 
Bethea, Stop Snitching stands merely as a reminder of the importance 
of adherence to omertà, the underground code of silence that forbids 
individuals who are involved in illegal activities from providing 
incriminating information about one another.34  In his mind, the lack 
of civilian cooperation and concomitant soaring rates of unsolved 
crimes that have arisen out of Stop Snitching are the result of a tragic 
misunderstanding. 
Nonetheless, it is the broader message—do not cooperate with the 
police, period—that took hold.  And though members of affected 
communities and law enforcement took note of the diminishing 
frequency of witness cooperation right away, Stop Snitching did not 
enter into the broader public’s consciousness until 2007.35  In April of 
that year, CBS’s 60 Minutes aired a story titled “Stop Snitchin’.”  
 
31 Id. 
32 Julie Bykowicz, Producer Says Education, Not Intimidation, Is Sequel's Focus; 
‘Snitching 2’ Out Soon, BALT. SUN, Dec. 20, 2007, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2007  
-12-20/news/0712200168_1_snitching-2-bethea-stop-snitching; see also Kahn, supra note 
23, at 88 (noting that “snitch” has a particular meaning in the DVD: “They are referring to 
people that are engaged in illegal activities, making a profit from it, and then when it 
comes time for the curtains to close—you do the crime, you do the time—now no one 
wants to go to jail.” (quoting Bethea)). 
33 Kahn, supra note 23, at 88; see also Bykowicz, supra note 32 (“Bethea said those 
labels don’t apply to ‘the little old lady on the block’ who calls the police about a drug 
deal.  ‘She is not considered a snitch,’ he said.  ‘She is a civilian doing what she is 
supposed to do.’”). 
34 See BUTLER, supra note 25, at 90 (defining omertà); see also Jacob Honigman, Can’t 
Stop Snitchin’: Criminalizing Threats Made in “Stop Snitching” Media Under the True 
Threats Exception to the First Amendment, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 207, 218 n.72 (2009) 
(same). 
35 See NATAPOFF, supra note 18, at 123 (noting that “‘stop snitching’ hit prime time 
when CNN anchor Anderson Cooper hosted a series of shows on the phenomenon”). 
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Reported by CNN’s Anderson Cooper, the story observed that an 
anti-snitching ethos had taken hold in inner-city neighborhoods 
throughout the country and noted that hip-hop artists played a 
meaningful role in the proliferation of the Stop Snitching message.36  
To illustrate this point, the story featured an interview with Cameron 
Giles, a successful rapper known to his fans as Cam’ron.  Having 
earlier referenced the fact that Giles had been shot but refused to 
name the shooter, Cooper tested the limits of Giles’ commitment to 
refusing to talk to police as follows: 
COOPER: Is there any situation where you think it’s OK to talk to 
the police? 
GILES: Yeah, definitely. Say, “Hello. How you feel? Everything all 
right?”  Period. 
COOPER: That’s it? 
GILES: There’s nothing really to talk about with the police.  I 
mean, for what? 
COOPER: If there’s a serial killer living next door to you, though, 
and you know that person is, you know, killing people, would you 
be a snitch if you called police and told them? 
GILES: If I knew the serial killer was living next door to me? 
COOPER: Yeah. 
GILES: No, I wouldn’t—I wouldn’t call and tell anybody on them, 
but I’d probably move.  But I’m not going to call and be like, you 
know, “The serial killer’s in 4E.”37 
Though Cooper’s hypothetical is preposterous—and though Giles 
issued a public apology in the wake of his comments38—the 60 
Minutes segment’s message to America was clear: Giles is not alone.  
There is a movement afoot within our urban centers pursuant to which 
 
36 60 Minutes: Stop Snitchin’ (CBS television broadcast Apr. 22, 2007), available at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/04/19/60minutes/main2704565.shtml.  Cooper 
opened his story with the following paragraph: 
In most communities, a person who sees a murder and helps the police put the 
killer behind bars is called a witness.  But in many inner-city neighborhoods in 
this country, that person is called a snitch.  “Stop snitchin’” is a catchy, hip-hop 
slogan that embodies and encourages this attitude.  You can find it on everything 
from rap music videos to clothing . . . .  [F]ueled by hip-hop music, promoted by 
major corporations, what was once a backroom code of silence among criminals 
is now being marketed like never before. 
37 Id. 
38 BROWN, supra note 12, at 9. 
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ordinary citizens, as a rule, will not cooperate with law enforcement, 
and crimes are going unsolved as a result.39  A scourge that had been 
festering largely unnoticed within a handful of urban hot spots was 
now national news, and the ensuing outrage was as uniform as it was 
swift.40 
Albeit perhaps unintended, the drastic expansion of anti-snitching 
norms within civilian populations is the legacy of Stop Snitching, and 
this expansion represents a meaningful departure from prior anti-
snitching norms, which tended to impose codes of silence primarily 
upon criminal actors, particularly those in police custody.  The 
following section explores this distinction and highlights why Stop 
Snitching represents a substantive departure from traditional forms of 
noncooperation, even as each at bottom relates back to the innate 
human desire to be loyal. 
B.  Traditional Forms of Anti-Snitching Norms 
The tradition among criminals pursuant to which they do not give 
up their confederates when questioned by the police is both long-
standing and well-known.  Though compliance with this tradition is 
seldom difficult during the ordinary course of events, to the extent 
that a defendant facing serious criminal charges has firsthand 
knowledge about the criminal activities of others, he faces something 
of a conundrum.  Possessing such knowledge places this defendant in 
a position superior to that which he might otherwise occupy because 
it presents him with options.41  On the one hand, he may refuse to 
cooperate and either take his case to trial or take advantage of the 
customary sentencing discount made available to those who plead 
 
39 Cooper explains to his audience that 
Stop snitchin’ once meant “Don’t tell on others if you’re caught committing a 
crime.”  But it’s come to mean something much more dangerous.  “Don’t 
cooperate with the police, no matter who you are.”  As a result, police say, 
witnesses are not coming forward; murders are going unsolved.  Reluctance to 
talk to police has always been a problem in poor, predominantly African-
American communities, but cops and criminologists belive, something has 
changed in recent years. 
60 Minutes, supra note 36. 
40 See, e.g., Norman, supra note 18 (deriding Giles based on his 60 Minutes comments 
and noting the “pathology and contradictions of the ‘stop snitchin’’ campaign”); Earl Ofari 
Hutchinson, Editorial, Rapper Cam’ron Wouldn’t Have Snitched on Cho, CHI. DEFENDER, 
Apr. 25, 2007, at 8 (“The anti-snitch message Cam’ron pumps puts [witnesses] squarely in 
harm’s way.”). 
41 Daniel C. Richman, Cooperating Clients, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 69, 77 (1995). 
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guilty.  On the other hand, he may cooperate with the authorities by 
informing on his confederates in the hopes of taking advantage of the 
“special leniency” the government has long afforded cooperators.42  
In a vacuum (absent fear of retaliation), the choice is an easy one; as a 
rational actor, he should cooperate in whatever way he can in order to 
obtain the shortest possible sentence (or no sentence at all).  But the 
reality is far more complicated. 
It is most often the case—though it is by no means always so—that 
a defendant with personal knowledge of another’s criminal activity 
has obtained it via a relationship of trust with that person.43  
Cooperating with the authorities can in such instances be viewed as a 
violation of that trust, as a form of disloyalty.  There is thus a 
pronounced evolution that takes place when a defendant commits to 
cooperating; whereas before he was just a criminal, now he is both a 
criminal and a snitch.  And it is based upon assuming the latter 
appellation rather than the former that the defendant subjects himself 
to being “generally regarded with aversion and nauseous disdain.”44 
This aversion and disdain arise in large part out of the fact that it is 
assumed that a snitch is cooperating primarily for selfish reasons.  As 
James Q. Wilson has noted, “[a] major motive—most investigators 
believe the major motive—of an informant is to obtain leniency on a 
criminal charge in exchange for information about accomplices 
involved in that charge or persons involved in other criminal 
offenses.”45  In other words, the act of disloyalty proves the snitch to 
be a selfish actor who, having committed a crime, seeks to avoid his 
just deserts.  This perception alone can explain the public’s disdain 
for snitches, and it also helps to explain why choosing to become a 
snitch may subject a defendant to physical retaliation, loss of 
employment, or other forms of marketplace retaliation.46 
But there are psychic costs as well.  A would-be snitch must accept 
that, upon turning on his confederates, he has violated the 
 
42 Id. at 77–78. 
43 Id. at 78. 
44 Richard C. Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent 
Provocateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091, 1093 (1951); see also GEORGE P. FLETCHER, LOYALTY: 
AN ESSAY ON THE MORALITY OF RELATIONSHIPS 8 (1993) (“Some of the strongest moral 
epithets in the English language are reserved for the weak who cannot meet the threshold 
of loyalty: They commit adultery, betrayal, treason.”). 
45 JAMES Q. WILSON, THE INVESTIGATORS: MANAGING F.B.I. AND NARCOTICS 
AGENTS 65 (1978); see also Richman, supra note 41, at 82. 
46 Richman, supra note 41, at 79, 82. 
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fundamental human value of loyalty.  He has become the tattletale he 
once mocked as a child; has turned his back on individuals who have 
in many cases been his mentors, peers, and friends; has chosen to 
escape or diminish his liability in exchange for creating liability for 
another.  And he must live with each of these realities for the rest of 
his life. 
Nonetheless, the case for snitching can be compelling.  
Notwithstanding the consequences, both external and internal, a 
snitch may reap a hefty reward “in the form of a far lighter sentence 
than he otherwise would have received.”47  Even in the abstract, the 
value of freedom cannot be overstated. 
Let us return to our hypothetical defendant from above.  His 
decision whether or not to cooperate will be informed by a host of 
factors and will ultimately (assuming little or no fear of retaliation) 
turn on the extent to which he values his freedom vis-à-vis his desire 
to remain loyal to his confederates.  As family, friends, and future life 
prospects play a significant role in this determination, so does the 
strength of his bond with his confederates—the depth of his loyalty to 
them.  Though the ultimate decision will vary based on individual 
circumstances, the tension between freedom and loyalty forms the 
backdrop of any defendant’s decision-making process. 
Such is not the case with respect to civilians who refuse to 
cooperate.  Though it could be argued that civilians subject 
themselves to the further degradation of their community by not 
helping law enforcement catch criminals,48 thereby curtailing their 
freedom on some level, they will not be deprived of their freedom in 
the literal sense upon refusing to cooperate.  They are also not being 
asked to inform on their co-conspirators because, by definition, these 
civilians are not involved in criminal activity.  In other words, there is 
a meaningful distinction between a civilian’s decision-making process 
regarding whether or not to snitch and a criminal defendant’s.  But as 
argued in the following two Parts, loyalty plays as critical a role in 
assessing Stop Snitching as it does in assessing a criminal defendant’s 
choice whether or not to cooperate. 
 
47 Id. at 85. 
48 But see infra Part II.A.2.a (discussing how mass incarceration within certain 
communities has rendered sending additional community members to prison or jail at 
times harmful to the community as a whole). 
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II 
THE PERSISTENT DESIRE TO BE LOYAL 
Though earlier portions of this Article have addressed loyalty in its 
most basic form, this Part, drawing on sources from across 
disciplines, discusses some of the specific ways in which loyalty has 
been conceptualized and understood in recent years.  It shows that, 
because a given individual has numerous loyalties of varying 
strengths, the depth of his or her loyalty to any one person, group, or 
principle is often unclear, even to the individual.  But when loyalties 
conflict, the result is greater clarity; in resolving such a conflict, an 
individual must determine which of his or her loyalties is stronger.  
This Part then discusses real-life scenarios in which conflicts of 
loyalties have arisen and how individuals have most commonly 
resolved them.  Most often the challenge is reconciling loyalty to 
one’s group with loyalty to more remote principles or institutions by 
deciding whether to report instances of peer misconduct.  Lastly, this 
Part examines police officer “blue codes” in order to illustrate anti-
snitching norms in a specific context, one that, ironically, closely 
resembles Stop Snitching. 
A.  Defining Loyalty 
“Loyalty” can be defined in many ways.  In the broadest sense, it 
describes the desire one has to be faithful to another, for whatever 
reason.  Inherent in any conception of loyalty is an assessment of 
right and wrong; we feel the pull to be loyal because we feel it is the 
right thing to do.  As one commentator has observed, “[t]he ideal of 
loyalty is at the heart of common-sense morality.”49  He continues, 
That morality highlights our special obligations to ourselves and 
one another and duties of personal loyalty to other people bulk large 
amongst these; they are the duties that we owe to other people in 
virtue of more or less intimate bonds, whether bonds of family, 
friendship, comradeship, collaboration, or whatever.50 
Loyalty can take many forms, the simplest of which is the loyalty 
an individual has toward another.  Though these loyalties might 
sometimes be initiated by an oath or pledge, the strongest person-to-
person loyalties come from within and are internalized in such a way 
that a deviation therefrom strikes the disloyal individual as a moral 
 
49 Philip Pettit, The Paradox of Loyalty, 25 AM. PHIL. Q. 163, 163 (1988). 
50 Id. 
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transgression.  So it is, for example, that a husband feels morally 
compelled to be loyal to his wife in a manner that need not refer back 
to his public certification to do so.  And so it is that a psychotherapist 
recognizes that she should not disclose her patients’ innermost 
thoughts without reference to her oath to maintain confidentiality.51 
Person-to-person loyalty can itself take many forms—be it loyalty 
to a friend, colleague, sibling, parent, child, or anyone else—and can 
vary depending on the circumstances.  One commentator has 
described this variance as follows: “[I]nside the family I might find 
my interests conflicting with my son’s, but, outside the family, loyalty 
is likely to make me see his interests as ours or even mine.”52  This 
perception of a unity of interests is characteristic of the strongest form 
of person-to-person loyalty. 
The second form of loyalty is loyalty to principles.  This form of 
loyalty is distinct from loyalty to individuals or loyalty to groups 
(discussed below).  “[O]ne is loyal to . . . principles if one sticks to 
them even when it is difficult to do so.”53  Principles to which one 
might be loyal include religious tenets, a prescribed code, or a general 
sense of right and wrong.  Loyalty to principles is not exclusive of 
other loyalties.  It follows that loyalty to principles and loyalty to 
individuals or groups can come into conflict.  What am I to do, for 
example, when my son, to whom I am loyal, violates an essential 
tenet of our faith, or when he commits a crime I deem reprehensible 
without justification?  Though this Article explores how such 
conflicts of loyalty are to be resolved in Part II.B., Part II.C., and Part 
III, for now it is sufficient to note that every individual is loyal to a 
 
51 Interestingly, as George Fletcher has noted, evidentiary rules seem to incorporate 
strong sympathies for the principle that the law should not interfere with 
significant relationships of loyalty.  The professional loyalties of attorneys to 
their clients and physicians and psychotherapists to their patients are secured in 
the sense that the clients and patients can prevent disclosure in a legal dispute of 
material transmitted to the professional in confidence.  . . . 
 . . . . 
 . . .  The husband need not betray his wife on the stand.  He can stand loyal, 
guarding the confidences of their intimate relationship. 
FLETCHER, supra note 44, at 79–80. 
52 R.E. Ewin, Loyalty: The Police, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Summer/Fall 1990, at 3, 3; see 
also Robert A. Larmer, Whistleblowing and Employee Loyalty, 11 J. BUS. ETHICS 125, 
126 (1992) (referencing parent-child as a particularly strong form of loyalty). 
53 Ewin, supra note 52, at 8. 
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certain number of principles and that this loyalty can at times come 
into conflict with his or her other loyalties.54 
Most important for recontextualizing Stop Snitching is the third 
form of loyalty: loyalty to a group.  Examples of group loyalty 
include loyalty to one’s coworkers, teammates, fellow residents, 
congregation, or community.  Groups can be defined in many ways, 
and the loyalty members feel to a given group can vary considerably.  
As a result, recognizing manifestations of group loyalty is often more 
difficult than recognizing person-to-person loyalty or loyalty to 
principles. 
Mark Van Vugt and Claire Hart have described loyalty as a 
“complex, multifaceted construct, consisting of emotive, cognitive, as 
well as behavioral elements.”55  They continue, 
[group] loyalty may be manifested through the experience of strong, 
positive emotions (happiness, joy, empathy) associated with group 
membership.  Cognitively, loyalty may be manifested via 
depersonalized trust in other members, and optimism about the 
group’s future.  And, behaviorally, loyalty may be evidenced in the 
sacrifices that people make to help their group . . . .56 
Due to the many possible manifestations of group loyalty, assessing 
the extent to which loyalty to the group is felt by each member can be 
challenging: “groups may be cohesive in different ways and, within 
the same group, members may contribute to the cohesion of the group 
in different ways.”57 
This is not to say, however, that there is not a correlation between 
certain shared experiences or characteristics and the formation of 
group loyalty.  As Van Vugt and Hart have noted, “a key determinant 
of someone’s group loyalty is the strength and nature of their 
identification with the group . . . .  When people identify highly with 
 
54 See id. at 4 (underscoring the likelihood of conflicts between loyalty to principles and 
other loyalties by noting that “each of us is a member of many different groups for many 
different purposes”). 
55 Mark Van Vugt & Claire M. Hart, Social Identity as Social Glue: The Origins of 
Group Loyalty, 86 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 585, 586 (2004). 
56 Id. at 586–87. 
57 Noah H. Friedkin, Social Cohesion, 30 ANN. REV. SOC. 409, 411 (2004); see also id. 
at 417 (“A large, complexly differentiated group, with members connected directly or 
indirectly (through intermediaries) by paths of positive (weak or strong) interpersonal ties, 
may be cohesive if the group’s social network has particular structural characteristics.”); 
Patricia A. Adler & Peter Adler, Intense Loyalty in Organizations: A Case Study of 
College Athletics, 33 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 401, 405 (1988) (“Loyalty can thus vary from person 
to person and group to group . . . .”). 
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their group, they see themselves primarily as group members.”58  
Spending a significant amount of time around and sharing 
experiences with a more or less static set of people fosters group 
identity and, in turn, group loyalty.59 
Oppositional forces can also help to create and strengthen group 
loyalty.  For example, a shared history of exclusion or oppression can 
enhance loyalty: “that a group of people is excluded (whether or not 
they are properly excluded) can make them feel a common cause in 
response to what they see as oppression and can result in the growth 
of loyalty amongst them.”60  Such loyalty, “provoked by a dislike or 
perhaps distrust of the other group, is likely to be marked by behavior 
that ignores legitimate interests and concerns of the other group.”61  
This loyalty can be further strengthened in situations where there is a 
perceived inequality of resources62 or where group members 
“perceive a threat to the status of [their] group.”63 
Taken together, these criteria suggest that the poor, black 
communities in which Stop Snitching is most prominent are fertile 
grounds for the formation of strong bonds of group loyalty.64  The 
 
58 Van Vugt & Hart, supra note 55, at 587. 
59 Friedkin, supra note 57, at 417 (noting that “investigators have emphasized the extent 
of positive interpersonal ties among persons as a basis of social cohesion” and adding that 
others have “argued that social cohesion is indicated by the number of mutual dyadic ties 
within the group”); see also id. at 419 (“A high density of positive interpersonal 
attachments indicates that people are involved, on average, in rewarding relationships with 
a large fraction of group members.”). 
60 Ewin, supra note 52, at 13; see also id. at 8 (noting that one can be loyal to “groups 
with whom one has been through danger”). 
61 Id. at 13.  In a similar vein, but at a more basic level, individuals’ identification as 
members of one group, and not as members of other groups, can also help to create and 
strengthen group loyalty.  “An [exclusive] in-group identification triggers a de-
individuated state in which group members reference their attitudes and behaviors to the 
prototypical norms that are most characteristic of the in-group and uncharacteristic of the 
out-groups.”  Friedkin, supra note 57, at 420.  Once established, these in-group norms 
become self-enhancing, and as the distinction between in-group and out-group behavior 
grows, it reinforces negative stereotypes about the members of other groups, thereby 
increasing in-group loyalty.  Id. 
62 Friedkin, supra note 57, at 421. 
63 Van Vugt & Hart, supra note 55, at 587. 
64 Though group loyalty is something of an amorphous concept, one’s neighborhood or 
community can be a group toward which one experiences a bond of loyalty.  Ewin, supra 
note 52, at 4 (“Again, in different circumstances, the loyalties expressed might not be to 
family, but to neighborhood, and, in such cases, my neighbor and his children would be 
part of my group.”); cf. id. at 8 (“One can be loyal to people, as one might be loyal to a 
friend with whom one had been through a lot or who had been a great help when one had 
had troubles.  One can similarly be loyal to groups of people with whom one has grown up 
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social and economic isolation that these groups experience65 fosters a 
greater sense of group identity than would otherwise be the case,66 
and the exclusion many members of these communities have felt and 
continue to experience helps to foster a strong sense of group 
loyalty.67  Elaborating on this point, George Fletcher explains that 
one’s loyalties arise in large part from one’s “historical self,” meaning 
that one’s place of birth, circumstances of growing up, and childhood 
experiences play the most significant role in shaping our primary 
loyalties—to families, groups, or nations.68  Where one has been born 
into a community in which opportunities and exposure to outside 
groups are limited, one’s historical self tends to be more strongly 
linked to one’s community. 
Fletcher further explains that, because of the strong connection 
between one’s loyalties and one’s notion of self, individuals 
frequently adhere to the stronger of their loyalties, even when, from 
an external perspective, it might be wrong to do so: “Loyalties 
generally lead people to suspend judgment about right and wrong       
. . . .  In loyalty, as in love, there is not even an illusion of scientific 
neutrality and intellectual impartiality.”69  Thus, in attempting to 
resolve a conflict of loyalties, individual judgments about what is 
“right” or “wrong” are secondary to determining to which of two 
conflicting interests one is more loyal. 
Loyalty should therefore be viewed as neither good nor bad in and 
of itself,70 but as simply an aspirational value fundamental to human 
 
or groups one has deliberately joined or groups with whom one has been through danger or 
hard times, and so on.” (footnote omitted)).  Part III assesses Stop Snitching through the 
lens of loyalty by using one’s neighborhood or community as the relevant group. 
65 See, e.g., WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED: THE INNER CITY, 
THE UNDERCLASS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1987) (noting the political, social, and economic 
isolation of members of the most impoverished inner-city neighborhoods); WILLIAM 
JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS: THE WORLD OF THE NEW URBAN POOR 
(1996) (same). 
66 See supra notes 58–60 and accompanying text. 
67 See supra notes 60–61 and accompanying text. 
68 FLETCHER, supra note 44, at 16–18. 
69 Id. at 36, 61; see also Ewin, supra note 52, at 5 (“Loyalty is an emotional tie that can 
lead people to be unreasonable and to overlook and override proper claims on them.”). 
70 See Bryan Byers & William G. Powers, Criminal Justice and Ethical Ideology: An 
Exploration of a Loyalty-Truthfulness Dilemma, 25 J. CRIM. JUST. 527, 529 (1997) (“The 
term loyalty often conjures up images of righteousness and correctness, while disloyalty 
may be seen as negative or deleterious.”  But in reality, it “seems to be relative, and any 
value-laden meaning that may be attached to loyalty and disloyalty will fluctuate with the 
circumstances to which the concept is being applied.”). 
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behavior.  Whether remaining loyal to a particular interest is 
ultimately good or bad, right or wrong, thus depends on the 
circumstances; loyalty is not always good or right, and disloyalty is 
not always bad or wrong.  And because one frequently encounters 
scenarios in which two or more loyalties conflict with one another,71 
it is impossible for one to remain loyal at all times. 
Regardless of the underlying crime, at its most basic level, the 
decision to snitch carries with it an implicit privileging of one loyalty 
over another; one who snitches is being loyal to the state and disloyal 
to the assailant (who will face punishment as a result) and, in many 
instances, to one’s community at large.72  In contemporary society, 
where “objects of our loyalty are families, tribes, or communities that 
at best overlap haphazardly with organized political authority,”73 
deciding whether to be loyal to the state or to another constituency (be 
it the assailant or the community at large) can be particularly 
challenging.  As Fletcher notes, “we no longer can fuse the 
communities that compel our loyalty with the authorities that collect 
our taxes, exact military service from us, and organize the economies 
that sustain our material existence.”74  In an ideal world, loyalty to the 
state and loyalty to one’s community and its members would never 
conflict.  But the reality is that the two are frequently at odds, and 
“the state’s demand for exclusive loyalty is rapidly losing its grip.”75  
This is particularly the case within the poor, black communities in 
which Stop Snitching is most prominent, the members of which, as 
noted above,76 have reason to exhibit stronger community loyalty 
than members of groups that are less isolated and marginalized.  The 
relationship between the strength of these bonds and the perpetuation 
of Stop Snitching will be discussed in detail in Part III. 
One final point about group loyalty before moving forward.  
Irrespective of the extent to which each of the aforementioned factors 
can and do create or enhance group loyalty, in-group “loyalty can . . . 
 
71 See infra Part II.B (discussing the inevitability of conflicts of loyalties given the fact 
that every individual has numerous loyalties). 
72 See infra Part III.A.2.a (discussing some of the ways that assisting police in 
imprisoning fellow community members by serving as a witness can negatively affect 
communities that have experienced mass incarceration). 
73 FLETCHER, supra note 44, at 58. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 See supra notes 60–67 and accompanying text. 
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vary from person to person and from group to group.”77  This point 
reminds us that no group can attain the same loyalty from all of its 
members and that regardless of the applicability of the factors 
described above, no group by its characteristics alone can create 
absolute loyalty—the decision to be loyal varies based on factual 
circumstances and from person to person.  With respect to Stop 
Snitching, this means that even the most loyal member of a tightly 
bound community will, under some circumstances, cooperate with the 
police and that others feeling few, if any, community connections 
might at times refuse to do so.  In this way we are reminded that the 
decision whether or not to cooperate with the police remains highly 
individualized, community characteristics notwithstanding. 
This section has set forth the basic characteristics of the three types 
of loyalty—person-to-person loyalty, loyalty to principles, and group 
loyalty—and noted both the inherently fluid, circumstance-specific 
nature of group loyalty and the reasons why one would expect there to 
be a particularly strong sense of group loyalty within poor, black 
communities.  The following sections show some of the ways that 
individuals address situations in which their loyalties conflict, setting 
the stage for the application of the group-loyalty framework to Stop 
Snitching, which will take place in Part III. 
B.  Loyalties in Conflict 
Given that any individual has numerous loyalties—to individuals, 
principles, and groups—it is inevitable that these loyalties at times 
come into conflict.  When facing a conflict of loyalties, one must 
decide to which other person, principle, or group one is more loyal.  
Though there exists a significant body of literature on the resolution 
of conflicts of loyalties, the scholarship that is most relevant relates to 
conflicts between loyalty to a group or its members and loyalty to 
principles or institutions.  This section offers examples of instances in 
which such conflicts arise in order to illustrate the numerous factors at 
play in deciding to whom or to what one is more loyal, a decision 
which, in turn, determines what action to take.  It employs examples 
from the military and other organizational settings to show that group 
loyalty most often trumps loyalty to principles or larger institutions. 
 
77 See Adler & Adler, supra note 57, at 405. 
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1.  The Military 
The United States Naval Academy’s mission is to train future 
Naval and Marine Corps officers.  In addition to attending classes and 
participating in drills, formations, and athletics, midshipmen (students 
at the Naval Academy) are “required to monitor both their own 
behavior and the behavior of their peers through a system of self-
regulation called the Honor Concept.”78  The Honor Concept includes 
a provision stating, “midshipmen will not lie, cheat, or steal, nor will 
they mislead or deceive anyone as to known facts.”79  In order to 
ensure that the Honor Concept’s system of self-regulation is enforced, 
“midshipmen are officially required to ‘take action’ or respond if they 
know that an individual has lied, cheated, or stolen.”80  Because the 
Naval Academy mandates enforcement of the Honor Concept and 
midshipmen are officially reprimanded for failure to monitor one 
another’s behavior, there is a strong “incentive for midshipmen to 
snitch on peers.”81 
Though “[l]oyalty to peers is usually compatible with loyalty to the 
[Naval] Academy . . . violations of the Honor Concept present 
occasions when these loyalties conflict.”82  Take, for example, a 
midshipman who notices a group of peers cheating on a problem set.  
That midshipman’s obligation under the Honor Concept is clear: he 
must take action.  But his closeness to his cheating peers will likely 
give him pause before doing so, as he faces a conflict of loyalties: to 
his peers, who will face the possibility of expulsion if reported,83 on 
the one hand, and to the principles of the Honor Concept (and by 
extension the Naval Academy), on the other. 
In studying snitching at the Naval Academy, Jana Pershing found 
that, more often than not, peer-group loyalty trumped loyalty to the 
principles of the Honor Concept.84  Based on her assessment of Naval 
Academy statistics, a United States General Accounting Office survey 
of midshipmen, and interviews she conducted with Naval Academy 
 
78 Jana L. Pershing, To Snitch or Not to Snitch? Applying the Concept of Neutralization 
Techniques to the Enforcement of Occupational Misconduct, 46 SOC. PERSP. 149, 150 
(2003). 
79 Id. at 156. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 150–51. 
82 Id. at 157. 
83 Id. at 156, 169. 
84 Id. at 171. 
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graduates, Pershing found that honor violations were widely 
underreported and that graduates who snitched on their peers faced 
ostracization.85  The most consistent and recurrent pattern among 
graduates who did not report their fellow midshipmen “was the appeal 
to a higher loyalty, that is, peer loyalty.”86  In other words, where 
loyalty to one’s peers came into conflict with loyalty to the 
requirements of the Honor Concept (which here acts as a 
manifestation of loyalty to principles of the Naval Academy), the 
former trumped the latter.87 
Though the Naval Academy is, as Pershing notes, a “total 
institution”—meaning that the “midshipmen are relatively isolated 
from the civilian community for four years”88—similar conflicts of 
loyalty arise within other subgroups of the armed forces.  In an article 
titled Loyalty is the Highest Honor, for example, Marine Corps 
Captain Gerald Ormerod explains the particular set of conflicts of 
loyalty that Marines face: “Every individual must balance the 
competing demands of various kinds of loyalty—to self, to 
family/friends, to one’s unit, to the Corps, to country, to God—and 
each of us will determine our priorities differently, based on our 
unique moral code.”89 
As always, there is the potential for these loyalties to conflict, and 
the conflict Ormerod highlights is between loyalty to one’s unit and 
loyalty to the principle of abiding by high ethical standards.  He 
writes, “[h]igh ethical standards are not necessarily a requirement of 
loyalty and trust.  . . .  Marines and leaders of Marines need to have a 
mutual feeling of commitment to be successful as a fighting force.”90  
“High ethical standards, although desired and sought, are not a 
requirement for this bond,” for they “do not directly affect the combat 
effectiveness of a unit as long as there is mutual loyalty and trust 
between the leaders and the troops.”91  In short, Ormerod concludes, 
“[t]he loyalty of a Marine is the highest honor that can be bestowed 
on a leader.  It is not something that should be taken for granted, 
abused, or betrayed.  In my view, it is more important than high 
 
85 Id. at 170. 
86 Id. at 171. 
87 Id. at 170. 
88 Id. at 151. 
89 Gerald J. Ormerod, Loyalty Is the Highest Honor, PROC. U.S. NAVAL INST., June 
1997, at 55, 55. 
90 Id. at 56. 
91 Id. 
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ethical behavior in forming a tight, cohesive unit.”92  To Ormerod, 
though loyalty to ethical principles is “desired and sought,” it is far 
less important to the functioning of a Marine Corps unit than loyalty 
to the unit and its commanders.  Thus, when the two loyalties conflict, 
it is the duty of a Marine to cast aside his principles and to remain 
loyal to the unit. 
Ormerod’s understanding of the hierarchy of loyalties in the 
military context is far from unique.  As Donna Winslow has noted 
with respect to the Canadian military, “[l]oyalty is encouraged at all 
levels as military values and structures grant primacy to collective 
goals . . . .  Individuals exhibit strong allegiance to their group and the 
group exerts social control over the individual member.  In the 
military, group allegiance is seen as essential to combat 
effectiveness.”93 
Commonplace as it may be, the primacy of group loyalty in the 
military context does not come without costs.  For, as Winslow 
shows, excessive “loyalty to the primary group can lead members to 
work at counter purposes to the overall goals of a mission or even of 
the Army and the Canadian Forces.”94  She concludes, based on her 
examination of the breakdown of discipline in two Canadian peace 
operations in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, that “[s]trong 
affective ties, which are encouraged by combat norms, create highly 
cohesive units that can actually impede the good functioning of the 
overall organization.”95 
Whether strong bonds of group loyalty are truly necessary 
precursors to effective military operations and whether they are 
ultimately a positive or negative feature of the military is beyond the 
scope of this Article.  What is important to note is that, in the military 
context, where loyalty to one’s group is given particular primacy, 
deciding whether to be loyal to one’s group or principles can often 
prove vexing.  As these examples show, loyalty to peers frequently 
trumps loyalty to principles in the military setting, and this privileging 
is often not just tolerated but celebrated. 
 
92 Id. 
93 Donna Winslow, Misplaced Loyalties: The Role of Military Culture in the 
Breakdown of Discipline in Peace Operations, 35 CANADIAN REV. SOC. & ANTHRO. 345, 
345–46 (1998); see also Ormerod, supra note 89, at 56 (“For a unit to function effectively, 
all members must be loyal to one another and to their leadership.”). 
94 Winslow, supra note 92, at 346. 
95 Id. at 364. 
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To be sure, it is in a sense unsurprising that the military places 
particular importance on fostering group loyalty at the expense of 
loyalty to principles, given its primary objective of preparing its 
members for life-and-death situations in which group members must 
know that they can trust and rely upon one another without 
qualification.  What may be less intuitive is that individuals in settings 
that are not in any way potentially dangerous face and resolve 
conflicts of loyalty in a similar way.  The following subsection 
provides one such example. 
2.  Whistleblowing in Nonmilitary Organizational Settings 
Whistleblowing can be broadly defined as “the disclosure by 
organizational members (former or current) of illegal, immoral, or 
illegitimate practices under the control of their employers, to persons 
or organizations that may be able to effect action.”96  Whistleblowing 
is widely regarded as a valuable tool for reigning in organizational 
misconduct.  In this regard it has been described as “prosocial” in that 
it is a form of behavior that is “intended to help others.”97  At the 
peer-to-peer level, whistleblowing is considered to be of particular 
importance with respect to the interests of the organization as a 
whole: “Co-workers who are willing to monitor their peers’ behavior 
and report violations to management represent a potentially important 
supplemental control resource for organizations.”98 
Notwithstanding its clear value, whistleblowing in the 
organizational context is most often discretionary, in contrast, for 
example, to the mandatory “take action” provision of the Naval 
Academy’s Honor Concept.99  Thus, as one study found, “observers 
do not act when they do not view the form of wrongdoing in question 
as requiring action on moral grounds, nor do they act when they 
believe that their job does not require reporting the specific 
activity.”100  The same study found that, “even when it might appear 
 
96 Janet P. Near & Marcia P. Miceli, Organizational Dissidence: The Case of Whistle-
Blowing, 4 J. BUS. ETHICS 1 (1985). 
97 Marcia P. Miceli et al., Who Blows the Whistle and Why?, 45 INDUS. & LAB. REL. 
REV. 113, 115 (1991). 
98 Linda Klebe Trevino & Bart Victor, Peer Reporting of Unethical Behavior: A Social 
Context Perspective, 35 ACAD. MGMT. J. 38, 38 (1992). 
99 See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text. 
100 Miceli et al., supra note 97, at 126. 
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that one’s job requires the reporting of wrongdoing,” employees 
consider whistleblowing to be discretionary.101 
That whistleblowing is (rightly or wrongly) perceived as 
discretionary renders it reflective of the conflicts of loyalty described 
above.  An employee witnessing wrongdoing is frequently torn 
between doing the right thing for his or her organization—or, 
depending on the circumstances, for broader society—and remaining 
loyal to his or her colleagues by keeping their misconduct a secret.  
As one study notes, “[t]he social context within which peer reporting 
may occur can be represented as a conflict between opposing forces 
that pressure people to think and behave in different ways.  For 
example, powerful group norms against tattling pressure group 
members not to report other group members . . . .”102  In addition to 
these norms, the reporting of misconduct is at times explicitly 
discouraged, particularly with respect to reporting it to an external 
organization.103 
The pressures that potential whistleblowers face not to report 
misconduct, both implicit and explicit (frequently in the form of 
intimidation104), make it such that the decision to blow the whistle 
can have significant costs.  As a general matter, a whistleblower “who 
reports a peer’s misconduct to authorities outside the group can 
expect to encounter negative reactions,” such as no longer being 
trusted and no longer being considered part of the group.105  
Specifically, due to a tacit understanding “that employees will be 
loyal to their employer and respect the sensitivities and reputations of 
their colleagues,” whistleblowers “can expect to incur the wrath of 
both [their] co-workers and the organisation for which they work,”106 
for often the act of blowing the whistle is “regarded as [an act of] 
 
101 Id. 
102 Trevino & Victor, supra note 98, at 39; see also Elizabeth Wolfe Morrison & 
Frances J. Milliken, Organizational Silence: A Barrier to Change and Development in a 
Pluralistic World, 25 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 706, 706, 708 (2000) (referencing “empirical 
data indicating that employees often feel compelled to remain silent in the face of concerns 
or problems” and describing “‘a climate of silence’: widely shared perceptions among 
employees that speaking up about problems or issues is futile and/or dangerous”). 
103 See Miceli et al., supra note 97, at 114. 
104 Michael J. Gundlach et al., The Decision to Blow the Whistle: A Social Information 
Processing Framework, 28 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 107, 109 (2003). 
105 Trevino & Victor, supra note 98, at 40. 
106 James Gobert & Maurice Punch, Whistleblowers, the Public Interest, and the Public 
Interest Disclosure Act of 1998, 63 MOD. L. REV. 25, 27 (2000). 
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betrayal, a decision to bring the organisation into disrepute.”107  As a 
result, “the substance—and truth or falsity—of the whistleblower’s 
disclosures may wind up taking a back seat to the fact of 
disclosure.”108  Circumstances aside, nobody likes a snitch. 
It is against this backdrop that an observer of misconduct within an 
organization must decide whether or not to blow the whistle.  The 
reflections of three theorists are helpful in understanding the potential 
conflicts of loyalty with which such observers must contend.  Sissela 
Bok has argued, with respect to this dilemma as it relates to the 
disclosure of a matter of public interest, that a potential whistleblower 
hopes to stop the game; but since he is neither referee or coach, and 
since he blows the whistle on his own team, his act is seen as a 
violation of loyalty.  In holding his position, he has assumed certain 
obligations to his colleagues and clients . . . .  Loyalty to colleagues 
and clients comes to be pitted against loyalty to the public interest, 
to those who may be injured unless the revelation is made.109 
Under Bok’s view, an employee deciding whether to blow the whistle 
“must choose between two acts of betrayal, either her employer or the 
public interest, each in itself reprehensible.”110  In this way, a 
potential whistleblower can be described as facing a conflict between 
group loyalty and loyalty to principles. 
On the other extreme from Bok is Ronald Duska, who believes 
that, because the concept of loyalty inherently requires some form of 
mutuality, and organizations are not capable of forming a bond of 
loyalty with employees (due to their primary objective of maximizing 
profits), “there can be no issue of whistleblowing and employee 
loyalty, since the employee has no duty to be loyal to his 
employer.”111 
Robert Larmer finds fault with both Bok’s and Duska’s 
assessments of the loyalty implications of whistleblowing.  He 
believes that Bok overlooks the possibility that in some instances 
“blowing the whistle may demonstrate greater loyalty than not 
 
107 Id. 
108 Id. 
109 Sissela Bok, Whistleblowing and Professional Responsibility, in ETHICAL THEORY 
AND BUSINESS 261, 263 (Tom L. Beauchamp & Norman E. Bowie eds., 2d ed. 1983) 
(emphasis added). 
110 Larmer, supra note 52, at 126. 
111 Id. at 125 (describing the position proffered by Ronald Duska, Whistleblowing and 
Employee Loyalty, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BUSINESS ETHICS 295 (Joseph R. Des 
Jardins & John J. McCall eds., 1985)). 
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blowing the whistle,” such as where the misconduct revealed might 
ultimately benefit the organization, even as the organization would 
not on its own be inclined to disclose it.112  Larmer also disagrees 
with Duska, primarily because, notwithstanding organizations’ 
primary motives (most often profits), considerations of loyalty are not 
automatically irrelevant: “[T]he fact that an employer’s primary 
motive is economic does not imply that it is not qualified by 
considerations of the employee’s welfare.”113  In light of this 
qualification, Larmer argues, “it is fallacious to argue that employee 
loyalty is never appropriate,” as Duska does.114 
In place of Bok’s and Duska’s arguments, Larmer puts forth a 
theory of his own.  Because he believes that an immoral action is 
never in an employer’s best interest, Larmer asserts that, where the 
underlying misconduct is immoral, whistleblowing should be viewed 
as an act of loyalty.115  Thus, he concludes, “to whistleblow for 
reasons of morality is to act in one’s employer’s best interest and 
involves, therefore, no disloyalty.”116 
Combining the approaches of these three theorists, one is left with 
no sense of clarity.  Though Duska’s approach counsels toward 
whistleblowing in every case because there should be no loyalty to an 
organization, the act of blowing the whistle brings with it 
considerable negative esteem that must be considered by any 
employee who is aware of internal misconduct.  Bok complicates the 
potential whistleblower’s decision-making process by making it clear 
that the decision either to blow or not to blow the whistle carries with 
it an act of betrayal that cannot be avoided.  Though Larmer seeks to 
find a middle ground by asserting that whistleblowing for reasons of 
morality is not disloyal, he does not offer guidance regarding how to 
determine when an act of misconduct crosses the threshold such that 
it is morally repugnant enough to merit being reported. 
 
112 Larmer, supra note 52, at 127.  In making this point, Larmer notes that “employers 
very rarely approve of whistleblowing and generally feel that it is not in their best 
interests.”  Id. at 126–27.  Larmer’s disagreement with Bok hinges on the fact that 
employers may sometimes be incorrect and that whistleblowing can sometimes be in an 
employer’s best interest.  The act of whistleblowing therefore need not be perceived as an 
act of disloyalty to an employer.  Id. at 127. 
113 Id. at 126. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. at 127–28. 
116 Id. at 128. 
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At bottom, a potential whistleblower must rely upon his or her 
conscience in determining whether to disclose misconduct within his 
or her organization.  Notwithstanding the consequences, Bok, Duska, 
and Larmer all seem to agree that certain acts should be reported 
regardless of the loyalty an employee feels to his or her organization.  
But ultimately, each employee must make this decision based on the 
loyalty he or she feels to his or her colleagues vis-à-vis the extent to 
which he or she endeavors to remain loyal to his or her principles or 
the organization as a whole.  Reconciling these loyalties is never easy 
and necessarily varies from person to person. 
This subsection has illustrated some of the ways that conflicts of 
loyalty can arise in nonmilitary organizational contexts, domains in 
which the preservation of one’s life cannot be said to underlie the 
strength of the loyalty bonds group members feel.  In conjunction 
with the previous subsection, it has shown some of the ways that 
loyalty to one’s group can come into conflict with loyalty to one’s 
principles or a larger organization and offered some insights as to 
how such conflicts are and should be resolved.  Both of these 
subsections have suggested that deciding whether to tell on a peer is 
both inherently ethically challenging and most often resolved in favor 
of privileging relationships with group members by not reporting peer 
misconduct.  The following section examines a specific professional 
realm in which conflicts of loyalty arise with particular frequency and 
are most obviously relatable to Stop Snitching—that of police 
officers. 
C.  The Pervasiveness of Anti-Snitching Norms Among Police Officers 
Much has been written about police department “blue codes,” a 
term describing the code of silence that is a meaningful component of 
police culture in departments throughout the world.  “Generally,” one 
commentator has observed, “the code of silence refers to the refusal 
of a police officer to ‘rat’ on fellow officers, even if the officer has 
knowledge of wrongdoing or misconduct.”117  Dating back in one 
form or another in the United States to at least the 1840s, the code of 
silence has traditionally protected officers involved in ordinary 
 
117 Myriam E. Gilles, Breaking the Code of Silence: Rediscovering “Custom” in 
Section 1983 Municipal Liability, 80 B.U. L. REV. 17, 64 (2000).  As William J. Giannetti 
Jr. has noted, “[t]his tradition calls for loyalty to an errant officer, recognition of the 
possibility of redemption, and concern about the humiliating shame should an officer’s 
mistakes be paraded before the world.”  William J. Giannetti, Jr., Commentary: Handling 
Dirty Laundry, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Summer/Fall 2003, at 43, 43. 
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corruption from being reported by their peers.  In its modern form, 
however, the code has been extended to such an extent that officers 
now feel obligated to cover up for their fellow officers who violate 
civil rights via other forms of misconduct, violent or otherwise,118 as 
well as for “brutal acts, petty thefts, extortionate behavior, abuses of 
power, and other illegalities.”119 
In order to create solidarity with his or her fellow officers, “[e]very 
officer tacitly agrees to uphold” the code of silence.120  As a result, 
given the nature of police work—which requires among other things 
that officers make “numerous illegal and semi-legal decisions . . . 
from time to time”121—a good deal of “bad lying”—for example, 
lying on a report, lying to internal affairs, or lying on the witness 
stand—takes place in the ordinary course of police work.122  No 
officer who has bought into this system (which is to say, nearly every 
officer) wants his or her instances of “bad lying” to be discovered 
because they could lead to discipline regardless of their import.  
Officers in turn cover for others in part out of the expectation that 
others will cover for them.  Because it accordingly arises primarily 
out of a sense of self-preservation, the code of silence is said to be the 
strongest code adhered to within police departments, and it is 
“stronger than similar tacit norms in the highly regarded professions 
of medicine and law.”123 
 
118 Gilles, supra note 117, at 64–65. 
119 Stan K. Shernock, The Effects of Patrol Officers’ Defensiveness Toward the Outside 
World on Their Ethical Orientations, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Summer/Fall 1990, at 24, 25; 
see also id. (noting without qualification that “it is an unwritten law in police departments 
that police officers must never testify against their brother officers”). 
120 Id.  Shernock also references a study in which, when asked to name the most 
desirable characteristic of a rookie, forty-seven percent of officers said “‘he should keep 
his mouth shut’” and thirteen percent said “‘he shouldn’t be a stool pigeon.’”  Id. 
121 Id. 
122 NORM STAMPER, BREAKING RANK: A TOP COP’S EXPOSÉ OF THE DARK SIDE OF 
AMERICAN POLICING 129 (2005). 
123 Shernock, supra note 119, at 25 (internal citation omitted).  In addition to the police, 
doctors, and lawyers, another example of a profession having a widespread code of silence 
regarding member misconduct is the priesthood, though the recent sex scandal involving 
priests has led to a significant evolution in this norm.  See Jean-Pierre Benoît & Juan 
Dubra, Why Do Good Cops Defend Bad Cops?, 3 INT’L ECON. REV. 787, 789, 802–03 
(2004).  Paul Butler has described the widely accepted anti-snitching norm that is 
prevalent among journalists.  BUTLER, supra note 25, at 90 (“Journalists are ethically 
bound not to reveal their sources, even when the source is tied to criminal conduct.  This 
duty not to snitch is actually protected by the law of most states.”).  Butler notes that, 
when New York Times reporter Judith Miller refused to testify regarding information she 
had obtained about possible crimes committed by officials in the George W. Bush 
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Several commentators have likened the police code of silence to 
the Mafia code of omertà.124  But there is an important distinction 
between these two otherwise similar codes: “Whereas the Mafia code 
of conduct involves lawbreakers protecting each other, the police 
code involves some honest policemen protecting criminal policemen, 
as well as competent policemen protecting incompetent ones.”125  
Thus, police officers face a more meaningful, even ironic, conflict of 
loyalty when assessing peer misconduct or criminality than do Mafia 
members doing the same, for the officers have sworn to be loyal to 
and uphold principles of law, order, and the promotion of the public 
good.  Nonetheless, as suggested above, more often than not police 
officers choose to be loyal to their group at the expense of loyalty to 
the state and their sworn principles,126 and this privileging of the 
immediate over the more remote mirrors the manner of resolving 
conflicts of loyalty discussed above in Part II.B. 
Before exploring the origins of why it is that law-abiding, 
competent police officers consistently go to such great lengths to 
protect crooked and incompetent ones—in other words, why it is that 
police officer in-group loyalty is so particularly strong—it is worth 
 
administration and was subsequently held in contempt of court under federal law, she was 
painted as a hero and visited in jail by “numerous luminaries . . . including United States 
senators, other high government officials, and famous journalists such as Tom Brokaw.”  
Id. at 90–91; cf. Benoît & Dubra, supra note 122, at 789 (noting that “there is no 
comparable wall of silence among professors” and that, should a professor “choose to side 
with a student against another professor in a grading dispute, he or she would not face the 
opprobrium of uninvolved faculty members”). 
124 See, e.g., Benoît & Dubra, supra note 123, at 787; Gobert & Punch, supra note 106, 
at 27; Giannetti, supra note 117, at 48 n.2; see also supra note 34 and accompanying text 
(defining omertà). 
125 Benoît & Dubra, supra note 123, at 787.  As noted below, see infra note 179 and 
accompanying text, this manner of “honest policemen protecting criminal policeman” 
mirrors the manner in which “civilian” witnesses at times protect criminals by not 
reporting their crimes to the police. 
126 Though, as noted above, see supra note 120, loyalty to the police force is inculcated 
from the time officers are rookies, and it grows stronger over time.  As Ewin has noted 
with respect to a typical senior member of a police force, 
loyalty to the Police Force and the people in it will have come to outweigh what 
was only ever a vague and abstract loyalty to the community.  In important 
respects, he will have rejected the values of the outside community, and be 
prepared to go to extraordinary and sometimes illegal lengths to protect what he 
believes to be the interests of the Police Force and of his police brothers.  Loyalty 
to the Force has become the purpose, rather than the means, of fulfilling his duty. 
Ewin, supra note 52, at 8 (quoting COMM’N OF INQUIRY INTO POSSIBLE ILLEGAL 
ACTIVITIES & ASSOCIATED POLICE MISCONDUCT, REPORT OF A COMMISSION OF INQUIRY 
PURSUANT TO ORDERS IN COUNCIL 210 (1989)). 
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noting some of the costs associated with rigid adherence to the police 
code of silence.  First, there is the cost to officers who deviate from 
the norm.  Because the code of silence has been so successfully 
normalized, officers who deviate from it by reporting their fellow 
officers’ misconduct face severe consequences, including social 
snubbing, malicious mischief, or sabotage.127 
The example of Paula White-Ruiz, a New York City police officer 
whose story is borrowed from an article by Myriam Gilles,128 
illustrates the manner in which defiance of the police code of silence 
often plays out.  After a search in which a large sum of money went 
missing, White-Ruiz reported to her supervisors her suspicion that her 
partner, John Ward, had stolen it.  Though Ward was eventually fired 
because White-Ruiz’s suspicion was correct, White-Ruiz suffered 
consequences of her own.  Immediately shunned at work the day after 
reporting her partner, she found her tires slashed that evening.129  
Within a week, her captain recommended that she be transferred, and, 
upon arrival at her new precinct, White-Ruiz found the words “Black 
Bitch” written on her locker.130  She was regularly called a “rat” and 
a “cheese-eater.”  Her locker was further tampered with, and her car, 
next to which she once found a dead rat, was again vandalized.  In 
one particularly troubling incident, her fellow officers refused to 
provide backup in a dangerous situation.131  Such harassment has the 
effect of signaling to others that the code of silence is not to be 
broken, and concerns about self-preservation therefore act as a means 
of insuring compliance with loyalty to fellow officers, 
notwithstanding an individual officer’s ethical preference for 
reporting misconduct.  In this way—due to rigid, often harsh 
enforcement—the police code of silence perpetuates itself.132 
That the code of silence is self-perpetuating brings us to the 
second, and more significant, cost of police officers’ rigid adherence 
to it: the cost to broader society.  Because it is taken for granted that 
 
127 STAMPER, supra note 122, at 135. 
128 See Gilles, supra note 117, at 70–71; see also White-Ruiz v. City of New York, 983 
F. Supp. 365 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
129 White-Ruiz, 983 F. Supp. at 368. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. at 369–71. 
132 As Ewin observes regarding the willingness of police to cover up for each other, 
“[a]s such procedures become institutionalized, only those police officers willing to go 
along with them will remain in the force, and, as public perception of these activities in the 
police force becomes common, only those who seek such activities will join the force         
. . . .”  Ewin, supra note 52, at 6. 
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police officers will be loyal to other officers by not reporting their 
misconduct, police over time have become increasingly brazen with 
respect to the criminal acts they are willing to commit. 
General acceptance amongst police officers that they can act with 
impunity . . . makes possible forays into organized crime that, 
otherwise, would have been stamped out as soon as they appeared.  
The loyalty that makes police officers willing to cover up for each 
other is what makes possible this criminality and the consequent 
undermining of the police force.133 
In other words, the confidence police officers have in not being 
caught—which arises out of the code of silence—permits them to 
cloak themselves in an aegis of rectitude: “The police code effectively 
requires that it be assumed that whatsoever is done by a police officer 
legitimately occurs in the course of his duty.”134  Thus cloaked, police 
may act with greater and greater impunity over time, all the while 
confident that, to the extent the only witnesses to their misconduct are 
other officers, they will never have to face formal consequences. 
Recognizing the deeply problematic nature of this state of affairs, 
one might wonder how the police code of silence has grown into its 
present form.  The most persuasive explanation is that at the heart of 
the construct of the code of silence is a sense of family.  “Within the 
familial dynamic, loyalty is of crucial importance—loyalty to other 
members of it and thus to the code.”135  In many departments, police 
socialize almost exclusively with one another.136  And in cities in 
which police have a rocky relationship with the general public, they 
“come to depend on their fellows for physical security, friendship, 
sympathy, emotional support and a feeling of self-worth.”137  Under 
these circumstances, a police force can be viewed as something of a 
total institution, akin to the example of the U.S. Naval Academy 
referenced above.138  It therefore follows that the pull of loyalty 
within many police departments would be particularly strong. 
 
133 Id. (emphasis added); see also Gilles, supra note 117, at 67 (citing the code of 
silence as the primary reason for the persistence of police abuse, including perjury, cover-
ups, and the destruction of evidence, and the retaliation exacted on officers who report 
misconduct). 
134 Ewin, supra note 52, at 10 (quoting COMM’N OF INQUIRY INTO POSSIBLE ILLEGAL 
ACTIVITIES & ASSOCIATED POLICE MISCONDUCT, supra note 126, at 202). 
135 Giannetti, supra note 117, at 44. 
136 Ewin, supra note 52, at 7. 
137 Id. (quoting COMM’N OF INQUIRY INTO POSSIBLE ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES & 
ASSOCIATED POLICE MISCONDUCT, supra note 126, at 210). 
138 See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
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What is more, the nature of police work is such that a strong sense 
of loyalty is essential to its being done effectively.  Police work is 
often dangerous.139  “Any officer who has unexpectedly found his or 
her life and limb in peril can affirm [the] practical importance [of 
loyalty] in the power evidenced by an ‘assist officer’ call.”140  It 
therefore follows that “[r]eciprocity is a core aspect of police loyalty, 
summed up in the assurance that officers extend to each other during 
an ordeal that, come what may, ‘you cover my back, and I’ll cover 
yours.’”141  What this means in practice is that, due to the reliance 
upon one another that is essential to combating potentially dangerous 
suspects and surviving potentially fatal encounters, police officers are 
strongly inclined to come to the aid of one another, be it as an assist 
officer during a hazardous situation on the streets or as a willful 
denier of the misconduct of another officer. 
Further cementing the norm of police officers’ code of silence is 
the fact that police officers are often disciplined in a manner that 
focuses not on a given officer’s state of mind, intentions, or his or her 
actions per se, but rather on the impact of those actions.  What this 
means is that a highly visible or notable result of officer 
misconduct—one that is particularly “unhappy or tragic or politically 
embarrassing”—will be met by a harsher form of punishment than a 
result that is less likely to result in public outcry.142  As a result of 
this uneven, result-oriented manner of disciplining officers, which is 
the norm in most police departments, police officers “live in constant 
fear of being reprimanded, suspended, or fired, even for an honest 
mistake.”143  Due to this fear, officers are further inclined to cover up 
for their colleagues; one can easily imagine making an “honest 
mistake” that, if not covered up, could lead to the loss of one’s job.  In 
 
139 In this regard, anti-snitching norms among police officers parallel the norms of 
noncooperation among military personnel discussed in Part II.B.1.  In both instances, the 
dangerousness of the job is given primacy, and the need to form bonds of mutual trust 
among the rank and file is said to justify encouraging (if not requiring) members to remain 
loyal to one another by not reporting misconduct.  But as shown in the discussion of 
whistleblowing in Part II.B.2., similar behavior (i.e., a norm of not reporting) emerges in 
relatively safe work environments.  This suggests that, though the danger inherent in 
working as a soldier or police officer might provide a useful explanation of why anti-
snitching norms persist, it by no means explains why these norms might have emerged in 
the first place or why they persist in other, non-dangerous organizational settings. 
140 Giannetti, supra note 117, at 47. 
141 Id. 
142 STAMPER, supra note 122, at 225. 
143 Id. at 134. 
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this way, police department disciplinary procedures further perpetuate 
the code of silence.  It is for this reason as much as any other that “the 
first impulse of a lot of otherwise good and decent cops is to lie when 
called on the carpet.”144 
Though concerns about reciprocity and the notion of the police 
force as a form of family help to explain the persistence of the police 
code of silence, they do not render it any less problematic.  As shown 
above, police officers frequently engage in a deliberate attempt to 
obscure the misconduct of other officers, from misrepresentations and 
perjury, to assault, theft, prisoner abuse, and murder.  Though such 
behavior may engender a certain closeness within police departments, 
that police officers may wantonly disregard the law and their sworn 
oath to uphold it with little fear of being caught is clearly not in the 
best interests of society.  In this regard the example of police officers’ 
strict adherence to the code of silence mirrors similar norms within 
the military and in organizations that frown upon whisteblowing; in 
each case, group loyalty persists at the expense of loyalty to ethical 
principles, the strict adherence to which would in most instances 
result in increased rates of snitching and ultimately produce better 
results for society.  Yet notably, none of these instances of privileging 
group loyalty over loyalty to more remote principles have drawn the 
same level of misunderstanding as Stop Snitching has in recent years. 
Taken as a whole, this Part has shown that group members 
frequently develop a sense of loyalty to other members such that they 
are often torn when deciding whether to report misconduct.  Members 
of the military, potential whistleblowers, and police officers all face 
the same conflict upon observing misconduct: are they to be loyal to 
their group or to principles and institutional imperatives compelling 
them to tell?  Though some choose to abide by their principles, they 
do so at great costs, both internal and external.  In the face of 
incurring these costs, the desire to be loyal to one’s group most often 
overrides the desire to tell, even as reporting misconduct might, from 
an ethical and societal standpoint, be the right thing to do.  As a 
result, a pronounced anti-snitching norm has evolved and has been 
permitted to persist within each of these strata of society.145  The 
 
144 Id. 
145 It bears repeating that this norm is by no means confined to the military, nonmilitary 
organizations, and the police.  See supra note 123 and accompanying text (noting that anti-
snitching norms also exist among doctors, lawyers, the clergy, and journalists).  Anti-
snitching norms have also been observed in nonprofessional settings.  See, e.g., David L. 
Chambers & Steven K. Homer, Honesty, Privacy, and Shame: When Gay People Talk 
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following Part builds upon this showing by framing the Stop 
Snitching phenomenon as the manifestation of a conflict of loyalties 
very much akin to the ones referenced in this Part. 
III 
STOP SNITCHING AS A MANIFESTATION OF GROUP LOYALTY 
Stop Snitching has most often been perceived either as a 
contemptible breach of the social contract or as a puzzling 
phenomenon lacking a sound logical basis.146  This Part argues that 
interpreting it through the lens of loyalty shows that Stop Snitching 
can be not only ethically justifiable and logical but also, at times, 
prosocial.  The primary form of loyalty that is relevant to assessing 
Stop Snitching is group loyalty.  As noted above, defining “group” in 
the context of group loyalty can be difficult both because most people 
are members of many groups (e.g., family, labor union, congregation, 
team, etc.) and because the loyalty that a given group compels varies 
over time and from person to person.147  Nonetheless, one’s 
neighborhood or community has been recognized as a group with 
which one can experience a bond of loyalty.148  As shown above, 
members of poor, black communities are likely to experience a 
stronger sense of community loyalty than members of other, less 
marginalized communities.149  Focusing on how poor, black 
communities have been and continue to be policed, the following 
section discusses how oppositional law enforcement has strengthened 
 
About Other Gay People to Nongay People, 4 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 255, 255 (1997) 
(noting the “longstanding convention among lesbians and gay men in the United States: 
Do not reveal the sexuality of a gay person to a heterosexual person . . . .  Lie if necessary 
to protect her secret.  Violating the convention by ‘outing’ another person is widely 
considered a serious social sin.”). 
146 See supra notes 12–19 and accompanying text.  Again, the assumption here is that 
those who question Stop Snitching on logical terms accept that there are ways to inform or 
cooperate with law enforcement officers without placing the informant or cooperator in 
harm’s way.  See supra notes 19, 22. 
147 See supra notes 55–57 and accompanying text. 
148 See supra note 62–63 and accompanying text; see also Friedkin, supra note 57, at 
417 (discussing the manner in which a cohesive residential community can induce stronger 
forces on its members than one that is not cohesive).  Though “neighborhood” may be 
defined in many ways, as Todd Clear has observed, “we may accept the importance of a 
neighborhood as an analytical construct without worrying too much (within reason) about 
the different ways the term may be operationalized in research.”  TODD R. CLEAR, 
IMPRISONING COMMUNITIES: HOW MASS INCARCERATION MAKES DISADVANTAGED 
NEIGHBORHOODS WORSE 70 (2007). 
149 See supra notes 58–67 and accompanying text. 
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group loyalty—and concomitantly promoted disloyalty to the state 
and the police—in such communities. 
A.  Policing the Underclass and Its Modern Effects 
True to its inner-city Baltimore origins, Stop Snitching is most 
prevalent within, and most often associated with, poor, black 
communities in cities.150  In order to appreciate the tugs of loyalty 
with which members of these communities must contend, it is 
important first to recognize the extent to which police have failed to 
create the types of bonds that would foster loyalty from poor, black 
citizens.  As discussed below, poor citizens and people of color have 
long been targeted and mistreated by police, and in contemporary 
society, poor, black communities continue to be ravaged by modern 
police tactics that have resulted in astonishingly high incarceration 
rates.  The combination of these factors helps to explain why law-
abiding members of poor, black communities151 often view police 
officers as adversaries rather than as advocates. 
1.  Police History of Targeting the Poor and People of Color 
Tracing the evolution of American police forces back to the days of 
slave patrols, Kristian Williams notes that “[c]ontrol over the lower 
classes has been a function of policing at every point since the 
institution’s birth, and has served as one of the major determinants of 
its development.”152  Though controlling the slave population was the 
primary objective of early police forces, after abolition police focused 
their attention on the poor.  Laws targeted the poor, courts issued 
harsher judgments against the poor, and police officers “treated poor 
people with intense suspicion.”153  This tradition continues today in 
the form of “quality of life” and “zero tolerance” policies and the 
 
150 See Kahn, supra note 23, at 82 (noting incidents of refusal to cooperate with police 
in a number of American cities and attributing falling arrest and clearance rates with 
respect to violent crimes to a widespread lack of cooperation). 
151 James Forman notes that “even high-crime communities are made up principally of 
law-abiders” and that, though the youth within inner-city communities are “most likely to 
engage in criminal conduct,” “most delinquent and criminal conduct is concentrated 
among a small percentage of young people.”  James Forman, Jr., Community Policing and 
Youth as Assets, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 2–3, 6 (2004).  The prevalence of Stop 
Snitching within poor, black communities suggests that a majority of its adherents are law-
abiding citizens, thus begging the question of why they refuse to cooperate with the police. 
152 KRISTIAN WILLIAMS, OUR ENEMIES IN BLUE: POLICE AND POWER IN AMERICA 105 
(rev. ed. 2007). 
153 Id. at 106. 
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“war on drugs,” which disproportionately disrupt the lives of the 
poor.154  The result of such policies, among others, is that, “[a]s a 
rule, poor people go to prison and others do not.”155 
As Williams notes, “though there are divergences between race and 
class, the means for control in each area have always been very 
closely linked.”156  As the poor have often been the target of police 
suspicion and harassment, so have people of color; there is no 
denying that “[t]he history of policing in the United States is marked 
by racial injustice and interracial conflict.”157  This history manifests 
itself today in the form of minority, urban community perceptions that 
many police officers are racist.158  As one commentator has noted, 
“racism still plays an important role in urban politics and policing.”159  
There can be no doubt that the poor and people of color have 
historically been, and continue to be, subject to heightened scrutiny 
and prosecution in jurisdictions throughout the United States. 
 
154 Id.  For a discussion of the war on drugs and quality-of-life policies, see id. at 197–
222. 
155 CLEAR, supra note 148, at 61.  Clear reminds us that “[t]his pattern is as old as 
prison itself.”  Id. 
156 WILLIAMS, supra note 152, at 105. 
157 DAVID E. BARLOW & MELISSA HICKMAN BARLOW, POLICE IN A MULTICULTURAL 
SOCIETY: AN AMERICAN STORY 99 (2000). 
158 Eric J. Miller, Role-Based Policing: Restraining Police Conduct “Outside the 
Legitimate Investigative Sphere,” 94 CALIF. L. REV. 617, 623 (2006) (“The style and 
consequences of policing often lead to a public perception of institutional illegitimacy, 
where the minority, urban community internalizes the style and consequences of policing 
as race-based and racist.”).  Former Seattle police chief Norm Stamper’s experience 
suggests that this suspicion is at least in some instances correct.  In a chapter of Breaking 
Rank titled “Racism in the Ranks,” Stamper discusses an investigation he conducted while 
he was a captain in the San Diego police force.  He notes, “thirty of the thirty-one 
personnel (including my lieutenant and two of his sergeants) admitted to using racial and 
ethnic slurs.”  STAMPER, supra note 122, at 100.  By way of example, Stamper explains, 
“African-Americans were niggers, boys, splibs, toads, coons, garboons, groids (from 
‘negroid’), Sambos, Buckwheats, Rastuses, Remuses, jigaboos, jungle bunnies, and 
spooks.  Latinos were greasers, wets, wetbacks, beans, beaners, bean bandits, chickenos, 
spics.”  Id.  Though Stamper’s investigation took place decades ago and is not necessarily 
reflective of the opinions and candor of other police departments, it is worth noting 
because it illustrates the fact that perceptions of racism within police departments are, at 
least in some instances, well founded. 
159 Lawrence Rosenthal, Policing and Equal Protection, 21 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 53, 
61 (2003); see also Albert W. Alschuler & Stephen J. Schulhofer, Antiquated Procedures 
or Bedrock Rights?: A Response to Professors Meares and Kahan, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
215, 223 (noting that “police racism cannot be dismissed as a relic of the past”). 
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2.  Mass Incarceration and Community Member Disloyalty 
a.  The Indirect Effects of Mass Incarceration 
Whether attributable to targeting the poor, racism, or other less 
invidious reasons, it is clear that modern policing has had a 
particularly profound impact on the poor, black communities in which 
Stop Snitching is most prominent.  As a result of a series of policy 
choices, the U.S. prison population grew every single year between 
1973 and 2008.160  That year, the overall incarcerated population 
reached an all-time high, “with 1 in 100 adults in the United States 
living behind bars.”161  This growth has had its most significant 
impact on one subgroup of the population: young, poorly educated 
black men from impoverished communities.  About one in ten black 
men with high school diplomas is currently in prison or jail.162  
Among black male high school dropouts, the incarceration rate is 
37% (compared to the average incarceration rate of the general 
population, 0.76%).163  And of black male dropouts born between 
1975 and 1979, an astonishing 68% have prison records.164  Overall, 
“[b]lack men are seven times more likely to go to prison than are 
 
160 See CLEAR, supra note 148, at 16, 50; PEW CENTER ON THE STATES, PRISON COUNT 
2010: STATE PRISON POPULATION DECLINES FOR THE FIRST TIME IN 38 YEARS 1 (2010) 
[hereinafter PRISON COUNT 2010], available at http://www.pewcenteronthestates.org 
/uploadedFiles/Prison_Count_2010.pdf?n=880 (“In the nearly five decades between 1925 
and 1972, the prison population increased by 105 percent; in the four decades since, the 
number of prisoners grew by 705 percent.”).  Michelle Alexander notes that, “[i]n 1972, 
fewer than 350,000 people were being held in prisons and jails nationwide, compared with 
more than 2 million people today.”  MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW 8 
(2010). 
161 PRISON COUNT 2010, supra note 160, at 1.  The silver lining is that, as of January 1, 
2010, there were 0.3% fewer state prisoners than there were on December 31, 2008, which 
“marks the first year-to-year drop in the state prison population since 1972.”  Id.  The total 
U.S. prison population continued to rise, however, as the decrease in the state prison 
population was offset by a larger increase in the federal prison population.  Id.  The United 
States’ incarceration rate “is about seven times higher than the West European average and 
is approached only by rates in the penal systems of some former Soviet republics and 
South Africa.” Christopher Wildeman & Bruce Western, Incarceration in Fragile 
Families, FUTURE CHILD., Fall 2010, at 157, 159, available at http://www 
.futureofchildren.org/futureofchildren/publications/docs/20_02_08.pdf. 
162 Bruce Western & Becky Pettit, Incarceration and Social Inequality, DAEDALUS, 
Summer 2010, at 8, 10 fig.1. 
163 Id. at 10. 
164 Id. at 11 tbl.1. 
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white men.”165  Familiar (and troubling) as these statistics might be, it 
is not the statistics themselves that are of importance here.  Rather, it 
is the effect of mass incarceration of poor, black men on their 
neighborhoods that deserves special attention, for it helps illuminate 
why law-abiding members of such communities might be reluctant to 
cooperate with law enforcement in catching, prosecuting, and 
ultimately imprisoning additional community members. 
Though it might seem obvious at first blush that incarcerating those 
who break the law has a positive social effect, such is not always the 
case.  The incarceration model of crime control works best for 
communities in which few people are incarcerated and the disruption 
caused by their removal is minimal.166  In such communities, due to 
higher rates of human and social capital, criminals (few and far 
between) can be sent away to prison and return home without 
disrupting the fabric of the community as a whole.167  As a result, the 
cost of incarcerating a criminal is borne primarily by him and his 
immediate family, not by the community as a whole. 
But in certain poor, black communities, where “incarceration is a 
dominant dynamic,” 168 the effects of incarceration are far more 
significant.  As Dan Kahan has noted, “massive incarceration, 
particularly when concentrated on minority, inner-city communities, 
disrupts social organization and taxes institutional legitimacy.”169  
Though one of the justifications for incarcerating individuals is the 
amelioration of the problems of those who live in high-crime 
communities, when incarceration becomes too commonplace within a 
given community, it can have the opposite effect.170 
 
165 CLEAR, supra note 148, at 63; cf. Wildeman & Western, supra note 161, at 160 
(noting that one in five black men born between 1975 and 1979 experienced 
imprisonment, compared to one in thirty white men born during the same period). 
166 See CLEAR, supra note 148, at 80–82. 
167 See id. 
168 Id. at 65.  Clear explains that  
[s]ome neighborhoods have dominant numbers of residents either on their way to 
prison, in prison, or recently released.  Sections of Washington, D.C. have been 
estimated to have one in five adult males behind bars on a given day.  In 
Cleveland and Baltimore, there are neighborhoods with more than 18 percent of 
the males missing because they are behind bars.  For black children living in poor 
urban neighborhoods, having a close family member in prison or jail is 
commonplace. 
Id. at 64 (citation omitted). 
169 Dan M. Kahan, Reciprocity, Collective Action, and Community Policing, 90 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1513, 1523 (2002). 
170 CLEAR, supra note 148, at 93. 
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Elevated incarceration rates exacerbate the problems these 
communities already face in two important ways.  First, they increase 
social instability within already unstable communities.  Because so 
many men from within these communities go to prison or jail, there is 
a constant cycle of men leaving the community and returning some 
years later.  Both the point of exit and the point of reentry have the 
potential to be disruptive, and where the cycling takes place 
frequently throughout the community, further incarceration of 
community members can act as a destabilizing force having numerous 
negative effects.171 
Second, elevated incarceration rates within a community mean 
that, on a fairly routine basis, men upon whom other members of the 
community regularly rely can, for a not insignificant period of time, 
no longer be relied upon.  In this way, as Todd Clear notes, to view 
people who break the law as “merely bad” is  
a one-sided stereotype that not only ignores the assets they present 
to the networks in which they engage but also fails to account for 
the ways they benefit their environment.  It also fails to recognize 
the damage done to their other relational networks when they are 
incarcerated—networks often consisting of nonoffending family 
members, relatives, and friends.172   
As this quotation suggests, elevated incarceration rates impose costs 
not only upon those who break the law and are subsequently 
imprisoned, but also on other members of the community who suffer 
in their absence. 
Clear divides these community costs of mass incarceration into 
three categories: the costs to familial systems, the costs to economic 
systems, and the costs to political systems.  Examples of disruptions 
to familial systems are numerous and include interrupted parenting, 
the loss of role models and children receiving less supervision, 
increased single-parent homes with mothers on welfare, and the 
normalization of incarceration.173  There are both micro- and 
 
171 Id.; see also id. at 73–75 (discussing the “increasing levels of disorganization” that 
result from incarceration and reentry and the general effects of high turnover on 
communities). 
172 Id. at 87. 
173 Id. at 88; see also id. at 94–106 (discussing familial systems costs in greater detail).  
Wildeman and Western note that researchers have demonstrated an elevated risk of 
criminality, delinquency, and physical aggression for boys who have an incarcerated 
parent and that children of incarcerated parents are statistically at an elevated risk of 
homelessness, foster care placement, and infant mortality.  Wildeman & Western, supra 
note 161, at 168. 
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macroeconomic costs to mass incarceration within communities.  At 
the microeconomic level, because “most prisoners are an economic 
resource to their neighborhoods and immediate families” prior to 
incarceration, when a work-age male goes to prison, some of his 
economic activity is lost.174  At the macroeconomic level, mass 
incarceration shifts government funds from improving inner-city 
communities toward funding penal institutions.175 
The political systems costs of mass incarceration within poor, 
black communities are perhaps the most important.  Members of these 
communities are confronted with an “overwhelming presence of the 
American criminal justice system,” and as a result, the state is often 
encountered as “a coercive agent of control rather than a fair agent of 
justice.”176  Many inner-city children thus “define the power of the 
state as a nemesis to be avoided rather than an ally to be cultivated,” 
and “disillusionment with the political structure often erodes 
residents’ feelings of empowerment and reduces their willingness to 
participate in local politics.”177  This in turn reduces the likelihood of 
citizen involvement within these communities, which makes efforts 
aimed at community improvement even more challenging.178 
The community costs described above suggest some of the ways 
that the incarceration of significant portions of a neighborhood’s 
population can promote, rather than reduce, crime and worsen, rather 
than improve, communities.  Losing the familial and economic 
 
174 CLEAR, supra note 148, at 88.  Putting a number to the economic loss suffered as a 
result of incarceration, Wildeman and Western observe that “incarceration diminishes 
men’s earnings by up to 30 percent even long after leaving prison.”  Wildeman & Western, 
supra note 161, at 165. 
175 CLEAR, supra note 148, at 89; see also id. at 106–11 (discussing economic systems 
costs in greater detail). 
176 Id. at 89. 
177 Id. 
178 Id.; see also id. at 111–17 (discussing political systems costs in greater detail).  
Wildeman and Western take this critique a step further, asserting as an implication of their 
research the irony that “mass incarceration may cause crime in both the short and long 
term,” thus making it a root cause of citizen indifference to or distaste for law enforcement 
officers.  Wildeman & Western, supra note 161, at 170.  Further pointing the finger, these 
authors add that, “[b]y further diminishing the life chances of the children who grow up in 
fragile families, mass imprisonment may entrench a vicious circle in which the 
disadvantages wrought by being born into a fragile family are further compounded by the 
criminal justice system, thereby generating greater future inequality.”  Id.  In this vein, it is 
no wonder that members of communities hardest hit by mass incarceration are less likely 
to cooperate with the police.  See id. (noting that “U.S. crime policy has, in the name of 
public safety, produced more vulnerable families and probably reduced the life chances of 
their children”). 
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contributions of so many working-age men has a profound effect on 
these communities, as it forces nonoffending members to make up for 
the loss by whatever means they deem necessary and appropriate 
under the circumstances.  And the disillusionment with the state that 
mass incarceration fosters has ripple effects that will impact these 
communities for many years to come and can stand as a long-term 
obstacle to widespread community improvement. 
b.  Not Snitching as Prosocial 
In light of these costs, many law-abiding residents of poor, black 
communities face something of a conundrum when deciding whether 
to report the crimes of their fellow community members.179  On the 
one hand, they recognize that wrong is wrong, that those who commit 
crimes should be punished, plain and simple.  Viewing crime in this 
way counsels in favor of remaining loyal to the state by cooperating 
with the police.  On the other hand, these law-abiding community 
residents have observed that it is often not the perpetrator who bears 
the brunt of his punishment, but rather his family members, the others 
who have relied upon him, and, cumulatively, the community as a 
whole.  Accounting for these factors turns deciding whether to report 
a given crime into a cost-benefit analysis, one that in many instances 
counsels in favor of being disloyal to the state (by refusing to 
cooperate) in the name of remaining loyal to the interests of the 
community. 
Viewed in this way, the ethical contours of reporting a crime or 
cooperating with a police investigation can at times be unclear, as the 
decision hinges upon a series of assumptions meant to gauge the costs 
and benefits of each option.  To be sure, such an analysis is more art 
than science, but one can certainly imagine a witness who, though 
law-abiding and generally loyal to the state, might decide not to report 
a crime where the perpetrator is a community member, the loss of 
whom (through incarceration) the witness deems likely to do more 
harm than good for the community.  Such a witness’s decision not to 
snitch represents a privileging of community loyalty over loyalty to 
the state, one that is not only understandable, but also justifiable on 
ethical grounds.  The decision not to cooperate with law enforcement 
 
179 Though not identical, this conundrum is not unlike that which an honest policeman 
faces in deciding whether to turn in a fellow officer who has violated the law.  See supra 
note 125 and accompanying text.  In each instance, a law-abiding individual must decide 
whether to be loyal to a fellow group member or to be loyal to more remote principles of 
right and wrong. 
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investigations can thus, at times, be viewed as prosocial or beneficial 
to society, even as it does not promote the state’s primary interest in 
this regard—solving crimes. 
The importance of community loyalty to understanding Stop 
Snitching extends beyond cost-benefit analysis, however.  As Fletcher 
reminds us, though loyalty is a product of the historical self and one’s 
lived experiences, loyalty often surfaces in a space beyond the realm 
of “scientific neutrality” and “intellectual impartiality.”180  It can be 
inspired, cultivated, or solidified as much by emotion or whimsy as 
by experience or calculation.  The following section discusses the 
significant role that community loyalty plays in shaping the decision 
whether or not to cooperate with the police, separate and apart from 
the perceived costs and benefits of doing so. 
B.  Beyond Cost-Benefit Analysis: To Snitch or Not to Snitch? 
It is axiomatic that cooperation with the police is not required by 
law,181 and a cooperating witness must endure at least some costs.  As 
Kahan has noted, “[w]hen individuals report crimes, they expose 
themselves at a minimum to inconvenience, and possibly worse—the 
risk of violent retaliation at the hands of those they are reporting.”182  
What is more, due to the high societal value ascribed to loyalty across 
cultures and over time, snitching—a violation of personal loyalty—is 
generally disfavored.  As one commentator observed, the act of 
requesting witness cooperation “places law enforcement in the 
anomalous position of sanctioning disloyalty and rewarding 
betrayal.”183  As discussed at length above,184 nobody likes a snitch, 
and in relying upon snitches, police “disregard a taboo”185 by 
 
180 See supra note 149 and accompanying text. 
181 See BUTLER, supra note 25, at 96 (noting that, although there is a federal law 
making it a crime to conceal a felony and some states have enacted “misprison of felony” 
statutes mirroring this federal law, U.S. law requires “active concealment of a crime” for 
someone to be in violation of the law, and “no conviction for a state misprison of felony 
offense has been upheld since 1878”). 
182 Kahan, supra note 169, at 1524. 
183 Gordon Mehler, Informants, Rats, and Tattletales: Loyalty, Fear, and the 
Constitution, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Winter/Spring 1997, at 2, 2; see also FLETCHER, supra 
note 44, at 79 (“The state should not force people to betray their commitments to their 
friends, lovers, family, community, or God.”); id. at 95 (“The legal system should not 
intrude upon relationships of loyalty.”). 
184 See supra Part II (discussing the persistence of the desire to be loyal by not snitching 
on one’s peers). 
185 Mehler, supra note 183, at 2. 
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promoting behavior that in other circumstances they and most others 
would deem reprehensible.186 
The stakes are particularly high when police ask a witness to snitch 
on a fellow community member.  In such situations, due to the “deep-
seated need for strong personal ties and loyalties” among individuals, 
overreliance on intra-community witness cooperation “creates grave 
problems for a society that can lose all sense of its humanity because 
its members lose much of their feelings for those near to them.”187  
Intra-community witness cooperation can thus be viewed as a type of 
disloyalty that, if arising too frequently, can have a corrosive long-
term effect. 
In deciding whether or not to snitch on a member of one’s 
community, one must assess the pros and cons of doing so in light of 
personal and situational circumstances.  For many, particularly those 
who have infrequent, positive encounters with the police, the choice is 
an easy one; absent a particularly compelling reason not to (such as a 
credible threat), they will cooperate.  Notably, there is generally no 
concern about the long-term community effects of cooperating with 
the police for witnesses in this scenario because community corrosion 
arises primarily as a result of iterative processes—particularly cyclical 
incarceration and reentry188 and frequent intra-community witness 
cooperation. 
For members of communities in which there are frequent, often 
negative encounters with police, however, the decision can be far 
more complicated.  To be sure, many of these community members 
will in most instances seek to cooperate.  But for others, police 
tactics, past and present, weigh heavily on their decision-making 
process. 
As noted above, police have consistently targeted the poor and 
people of color, and poor, black men have been most affected by 
recent societal trends resulting in unprecedented levels of 
incarceration.189  Potential witnesses from within poor, black 
communities have in many cases observed police misconduct and the 
scourge of police officer “warrior tactics,”190 and they understand 
 
186 See supra Part II.C (discussing anti-snitching norms among police officers). 
187 Mehler, supra note 183, at 2 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
188 See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
189 See supra notes 156–65 and accompanying text. 
190 See Forman, supra note 151, at 20 (noting that “inner-city young people” are 
generally policed “under the warrior model—as threats to public order” rather than as 
potential collaborators).  Forman also relates that, within these communities, “the young 
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firsthand the direct effects that placing a community member in 
prison can have on his family, the local economy, and the community 
at large.191  It should come as no surprise that, when faced with 
resolving this conflict of loyalty—to the state (as manifested by a 
police force that is perceived as rarely on their side) on one hand, and 
to their fellow community member on the other—many members of 
such communities side with the latter by keeping their mouths shut.  
In light of their relationship with, and perception of, law 
enforcement—and in contrast to the members of other communities 
described above192—members of these communities might quite 
reasonably ask, “Why would I ever want to help the police in any 
way, shape, or form?”193 
Nonetheless, there exist a number of circumstances in which even 
the most staunch antipolice community members might cooperate.  
Such circumstances include helping to solve a particularly grisly or 
egregious crime, a crime committed against a potential witness or one 
of his or her loved ones, or a crime committed by a particularly 
loathsome criminal.  But as to more ordinary crimes—committed in 
environments in which crime is far too ordinary—the failure of police 
departments to create meaningful bonds with community members 
explains why so many might refuse to help law enforcement officers 
solve crimes as a matter of principle. 
The conflict of loyalties these potential witnesses must resolve is at 
bottom no different from any of the loyalty conflicts described in Part 
II.  It is a highly individualized choice that can prove difficult, just 
like deciding whether to tell on a colleague, classmate, or fellow 
 
are (statistically significantly) more likely to be both disrespected and illegally searched.”  
Id. (citations omitted).  One study of police use of force has found that, as a general matter, 
“officers were (statistically significantly) more likely to use force on males, nonwhites, the 
young, and the poor.”  Id. at 20–21; see also infra notes 211-212 and accompanying text 
(describing the “warrior model” of policing).   
191 See supra Part III.A.2.a (discussing the negative effects mass-incarceration has had 
on poor, black communities). 
192 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
193 It is worth reiterating that this refusal to cooperate, though sharing some 
characteristics, is distinct from the refusal to cooperate that arises out of the cost-benefit 
analysis discussed in Part II.A.2.b.  Whereas the focus there was whether the community 
and its members would benefit from a given offender’s incarceration, the focus here is on 
whether the police have earned a witness’s loyalty such that he or she feels compelled to 
cooperate in connection with a given crime.  Though some of the same factors are given 
weight under both modes of deciding whether to cooperate—and though both will in many 
instances produce the same result—it should be understood that there exist scenarios in 
which a cost-benefit analysis dictating that one should cooperate would be undermined by 
a sense of loyalty dictating that one should not, and vice versa. 
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soldier or officer.  Though resolving this conflict of loyalties is simple 
for many—particularly those who view the police as allies—where 
one’s “historical self” has arisen out of a marginalized community 
such as those in which Stop Snitching is most prominent, skepticism 
toward, and reluctance to cooperate with, police is as understandable 
as it is common.  That this skepticism and reluctance come as a 
surprise to so many reflects the societal gap194 that exists between 
poor, black communities and the white middle class that is 
traditionally considered the mainstream of American society, 
particularly with respect to perceptions of the police.195 
It is this perceptual dissonance that underlies the existing, 
misguided understandings of Stop Snitching.  But once recognized as 
a manifestation of loyalties in conflict akin to the others noted above, 
the decision not to cooperate with the police can be read as being both 
reasonable and ethically sound, even where it does not arise out of a 
cost-benefit analysis such as the one described in the previous 
subsection196 or out of fear for one’s safety.  Though by now the 
justifiability of Stop Snitching should be clear, a few words about the 
perils of external assessments of individual loyalty choices might be 
useful in swaying the unconvinced. 
 
194 Barlow and Barlow describe this gap in the following way: 
[w]hether they are police officers or everyday citizens, white people are baffled 
by the lower level of support for police among racial minorities, particularly 
African Americans.  In our various interactions with police officers, young and 
old, we have often heard them express genuine astonishment at small African-
American children expressing distrust or even hatred toward them as police 
officers. 
BARLOW & BARLOW, supra note 157, at 118.  This difference in perception relates back to 
Fletcher’s notion of the historical self.  Barlow and Barlow continue: 
What these white people do not appreciate, and what Black people are unable to 
forget, is the whole history of racial discrimination and mistreatment at the hands 
of the police.  The police and the entire criminal justice system are deeply 
implicated in the ghetto—in its formation and in its permanence. 
Id. at 119. 
195 Id. 
The vast majority of white Americans, particularly those in the middle and upper 
classes, have never experienced the police as violent, uncaring oppressors.  They 
have no frame of reference for envisioning the police as a serious threat to their 
lives.  They cannot appreciate the claims of racial minorities concerning 
systematic police discrimination and brutality. 
Id.  This disconnect plays a meaningful role in making Stop Snitching seem inexplicable 
or condemnable to many outside observers. 
196 See supra Part III.A.2.b. 
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With respect to matters of loyalty, external second-guessing is 
seldom of much use.  Though Fletcher argues that every member of 
society has higher and lower loyalties—and that higher loyalties 
“seem to have a greater moral claim on us than our more immediate 
attachments to family and friends”197—sound morality does not 
dictate that we always privilege the former over the latter.  “Though 
the higher, more abstract planes . . . often compel our loyalty,” 
Fletcher writes, “we are blessed with the capacity to reject the sirens 
of abstraction and to commit ourselves to the bonds of our immediate 
and concrete lives.”198  In other words, notwithstanding the general 
observation that higher loyalties (such as loyalty to the state) should 
trump lower loyalties (such as loyalty to the community), the decision 
to privilege one over the other cannot be mechanical.  Humans are not 
automatons, and to impugn another individual’s judgment with 
respect to a hard loyalty choice is to reject his or her humanity.  Put 
plainly, “[a]bsolute loyalty deprives us of our critical judgment; 
impartial ethics, of our human sensibilities.”199  Though some might 
argue that sound ethics compel all witnesses to cooperate under all 
circumstances (absent scenarios in which they might be harmed as a 
result), such a doctrinaire approach both obscures the complexity of 
such a decision200 and fails to account for the individualized, human 
circumstances underlying the resolution of any conflict of loyalties.  
Viewed this way, it seems particularly inappropriate for outsiders to 
judge Stop Snitching to be something that is egregious or peculiar.  
Rather, it should be understood as representing a set of personal 
choices not unlike those that all individuals regularly must make in 
resolving the numerous loyalty conflicts that arise in their lives. 
C.  Revisiting Izzy Ramirez 
Let us now return to Izzy Ramirez, whose 2007 murder, witnessed 
by roughly seventy-five people, remains unsolved.  Though Izzy’s 
killer should be found, prosecuted, and punished pursuant to any 
reasonable theory of justice, whether the witnesses who observed the 
shooting should feel ethically compelled to cooperate with the police 
 
197 FLETCHER, supra note 44, at 154. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. at 172. 
200 See BUTLER, supra note 25, at 91–92 (“The cultural codes against snitching also 
teach us that people who refuse to snitch are not, as they are sometimes depicted, lawless.  
Rather, they are confronted with competing rules—outside versus inside, state versus 
community, external versus clan.”). 
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in furtherance of this just result is a distinct question.  What is 
required, then, in assessing this witness behavior, is further 
exploration of the root issue—why might it be that none of these 
witnesses will cooperate even as their noncooperation acts to frustrate 
justice? 
For many of these witnesses, it may be that they are unwilling to 
cooperate because they reasonably fear for their safety.  Others might 
share this fear, but less reasonably so—after all, given modern 
technology, there are numerous ways to tip off the police without fear 
of reprisal.201  Some might know the shooter personally and, 
estimating the costs and benefits of turning him in to face a lengthy 
prison sentence, have determined that the former outweigh the latter.  
But there exists a fourth group of witnesses, those who, echoing 
Cameron Giles,202 simply want nothing to do with police officers and 
have no interest in helping them do their jobs.  These witnesses—
perhaps due to peer influences, perhaps due to the experiences that 
have shaped their “historical selves”—have adopted an ethos pursuant 
to which the police are the enemy, an external, oppositional force to 
which they have no desire to express their loyalty. 
Though condemning these witnesses in ethical terms is as easy as it 
is common, failure to understand the reasons why they might so 
steadfastly refuse to promote the just prosecution and imprisonment 
of Izzy’s killer renders any analysis of their actions fatally 
incomplete.  In an ideal world, all citizens would feel compelled at all 
times to privilege loyalty to the state in furtherance of the prosecution 
of bad actors over other, lower loyalties.203  But such is not always 
the case.  Often, for good reason, not all citizens feel equally the 
compunction to be loyal first and foremost to the state; the seventy-
five witnesses who to this day refuse to identify Izzy’s killer 
underscore this point. 
That said, acknowledging the reasonableness of an individual’s 
decision not to cooperate under certain circumstances does not require 
one to ignore the negative impact that widespread noncooperation can 
 
201 See supra notes 19, 22. 
202 See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
203 See FLETCHER, supra note 44, at 154 (“The higher, more abstract values of God and 
country seem to have a greater moral claim on us than our more immediate attachments to 
family and friends.”).  But as noted, Fletcher immediately observes that “this structure of 
values often gets turned around,” and he adds that humans are blessed with the ability to 
choose freely which loyalty to privilege in a given set of circumstances.  Id. 
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have on communities.204  In other words, one can simultaneously 
both recognize the ethical legitimacy of individuals’ choosing not to 
cooperate with the police and hope to eliminate Stop Snitching and 
the circumstances that created it.  In that vein, the following Part 
offers strategies police officers should employ in order to change the 
witness-cooperation dynamic within frequently disloyal communities. 
IV 
CREATING LOYALTY WITHIN FREQUENTLY DISLOYAL COMMUNITIES 
The recognition that Stop Snitching can be read as a reflection of 
the weakness of existing loyalty bonds between the police and certain 
communities suggests strategies for bringing it to an end.  Put simply, 
police officers seeking cooperation should attempt to find ways to 
give disloyal community members greater incentive to be loyal to the 
state.  To do so, they must reach out to community members by 
listening to their concerns, providing assistance, and, ultimately, 
forming meaningful relationships.  Though the strategies for doing so 
discussed below might be familiar to those versed in the literature on 
community policing, focusing these strategies on strengthening 
loyalty bonds—as opposed to the broader objective of reducing 
crime—will render them particularly powerful tools in curtailing and 
ultimately eliminating Stop Snitching.205 
In Reciprocity, Collective Action, and Community Policing, Dan 
Kahan succinctly describes the factors at play in fostering higher rates 
of community cooperation with police investigations.206  He writes, 
Citizens are more disposed to cooperate with police when 
institutions enjoy a high level of legitimacy.  The perceived 
legitimacy of an institution, it has been shown, depends largely on 
whether citizens perceive that they are receiving fair and respectful 
treatment by police and other decision makers.  In effect, citizens 
 
204 Cf. supra Part II.C (acknowledging the numerous reasons that police officers adhere 
to the blue code of silence while noting its harmful effects). 
205 It is axiomatic that reducing crime is exceedingly challenging, far more so than 
reducing the incidence of witness noncooperation.  Whereas the former has numerous 
underlying social, economic, psychological, cultural, and political causes, the latter, as 
argued here, ultimately comes down to relationships.  Though community-policing 
initiatives have had mixed results in reducing crime, there is reason to believe that 
repurposing the tactics arising out of the literature on community policing could prove a 
significant factor in increasing target-community witness cooperation. 
206 Kahan, supra note 169, at 1524–25. 
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reciprocate respectful treatment with cooperation and obedience and 
disrespectful treatment with resistance. . . .207 
Stop Snitching is one form of resistance employed by community 
members in response to disrespectful treatment by the police.  
Combating Stop Snitching thus requires police officers to invert the 
perception that they do not respect community members, to cast 
themselves as collaborators rather than foes.  The best ways to create 
this inversion arises out of the literature on community policing, a 
movement that began more than thirty years ago and remains 
prominent in various forms today. 
Though community policing arose out of a variety of sources, “of 
central importance was the growing consensus in the 1970s and 1980s 
that police-community relationships in many cities had become 
untenable.”208  Prior to and during this era, many police departments 
and officers “subscribed to the ‘warrior model’ of the detached, aloof 
crime-fighter who daily battles the hostile enemy—the public.”209  
Even more so than today, police officers in this period frequently cast 
themselves in opposition to the public.  As rising crime rates and 
academic research began to suggest that the warrior model was not 
working, police forces reconsidered their tactics.  Out of this 
reconsideration arose community policing, a movement which—
recognizing that in even the most crime-ridden communities there 
was a thirst for more and better police protection—sought “to replace 
the warrior model with one premised on the notion that the police and 
community could become co-producers of public safety, rather than 
hostile antagonists.”210 
Though public safety and the reduction of crime have been and 
remain the primary targets of community policing, its strategies 
inform efforts aimed at increasing witness cooperation.  Essential to 
all successful community-policing programs are efforts to reach out to 
high-crime communities in order to establish mutual trust between 
police officers and community members.211  As a Justice Department 
 
207 Id. at 1525. 
208 Forman, supra note 151, at 4. 
209 Id. at 4–5; see also supra note 192 and accompanying text (discussing the “warrior 
model” of policing). 
210 Forman, supra note 151, at 6. 
211 Forman reminds us that “even high-crime communities are made up principally of 
law-abiders” and that, though the youth within inner-city communities are “most likely to 
engage in criminal conduct,” “most delinquent and criminal conduct is concentrated 
among a small percentage of young people.”  Id. at 2–3, 6.  This reminder underscores the 
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report noted in a monograph titled Understanding Community 
Policing, “[t]rust is the value that underlies and links the components 
of community partnership and problem solving.  A foundation of trust 
will allow police to form close relationships with the community that 
will produce solid achievements.  Without trust between police and 
citizens, effective policing is impossible.”212  Specific to witness 
cooperation, the monograph notes that, 
[w]ithout strong ties to the community, police may not have access 
to pertinent information from citizens that could help solve or deter 
crimes. 
 Helpful information will be forthcoming from community 
members when police have established a relationship of trust with 
the community they serve.  . . .  Only when community members 
believe the police are genuinely interested in community 
perspectives and problems will they begin to view the police as part 
of that community.213 
Accepting that creating bonds of trust is essential to increasing the 
sharing of information pertinent to criminal investigations, the 
question of how best to do so remains.  The answer, though seldom 
effectively employed, is simple: police must develop positive 
relationships with community members.214  Numerous strategies 
exist, including supplementing police car patrols with foot, bike, and 
horseback patrols; becoming more familiar with community 
members; more effectively helping community accident or crime 
victims and providing timely emergency and medical services; 
helping community members improve neighborhood conditions; 
visiting community members at their homes; and treating community 
members with greater respect, particularly by reducing “[t]he use of 
 
fact that distrust, rather than fear of detection, most often plays the more significant role in 
fostering noncooperation. 
212 BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, UNDERSTANDING 
COMMUNITY POLICING: A FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION, at vii (1994), available at 
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/commp.pdf; see also Tracy L. Meares, It’s a Question of 
Connections, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 579, 590 (1997) (“The mutual distrust between African 
Americans and law enforcement officers makes it less likely that African Americans will 
report crimes to the police, assist the police in criminal investigations, and participate in 
community policing programs . . . .”). 
213 BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 212, at 5. 
214 See id. at 13 (“To develop community partnership, police must develop positive 
relationships with the community, must involve the community in the quest for better 
crime control and prevention, and must pool their resources with those of the community 
to address the most urgent concerns of community members.”). 
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unnecessary force and arrogance, aloofness, or rudeness” directed 
toward them.215 
Done simultaneously, these upgraded services, frequently carried 
out through informal channels,216 will help to develop a greater sense 
of trust between the police and the communities in which Stop 
Snitching is a prominent norm.  This trust will in turn “enable the 
police to gain greater access to valuable information from the 
community that could lead to the solution . . . of crimes.”217 
To be sure, reversing a cultural trend as prominent as Stop 
Snitching will prove challenging; altering the perceptions and 
attitudes of officers and community members alike will take time and 
require a great deal of hard work.  But there is reason to be optimistic, 
for it has been shown that once bonds of trust between community 
members and the police are established, they frequently tend to 
flourish.  As Kahan has observed, “[a]s citizens start to cooperate 
more and otherwise become more favorably disposed toward the 
police, the police form a more positive view of members of the 
community.”218  As a result, police officers become “more disposed 
to treat citizens with respect in their daily encounters, both because 
they fear them less and because they value their goodwill more.  
Treated more respectfully, citizens can be expected to reciprocate by 
behaving even more cooperatively.”219  In this way, the relationship 
spirals toward greater mutual trust; where once a culture of 
noncooperation had been the norm, a culture of collaboration can 
emerge. 
The Chicago Alternative Police Strategy (CAPS), a pioneering 
form of community policing begun in the early 1990s, underscores 
Kahan’s assertion about the cumulative effect that effective 
community policing can achieve.  In the wake of CAPS, community 
members “long accustomed to seeing the police as simultaneously 
indifferent to their needs and disrespectful of their rights, now were 
exposed to highly responsive and solicitous officers.  Unsurprisingly, 
citizens grew more trustful and thus more willing to cooperate with 
 
215 Id. at 16; see also id. at 14–17. 
216 Forman underscores the importance of informal contact between police officers and 
community members, noting that “informal contacts matter to community policing” and 
“are important to fighting crime and disorder, for they are part of how police learn about 
who is doing what, and who can be relied on.”  Forman, supra note 151, at 19. 
217 BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, supra note 212, at 16. 
218 Kahan, supra note 169, at 1533. 
219 Id. 
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the police.”220  Illustrating the cumulative potential of a relationship 
built on mutual trust, CAPS officers ultimately “reciprocated the 
citizens’ greater willingness to cooperate with them by treating 
citizens more respectfully, thereby generating an even greater 
willingness among citizens to cooperate with the police.”221 
By being responsive and solicitous, the Chicago police have been 
able to strengthen mutual trust and increase community cooperation.  
Though programs such as CAPS are aimed primarily at crime 
reduction and prevention, their success is instructive with respect to 
reducing and ultimately eliminating Stop Snitching in two ways.  
First, it shows that community policing can meaningfully improve 
target-neighborhood attitudes toward the police.  This is so even 
within communities that have had past relationships with the police 
characterized primarily by antagonism.  As relationships improve, 
loyalty to the state will inevitably increase, thereby increasing the 
frequency with which witnesses cooperate.  Second, community-
policing successes show that significant and widespread attitudinal 
changes can happen quickly.  Because trust accrues cumulatively 
through reciprocal positive interactions, once community attitudes 
begin to shift, there is the potential for them to evolve drastically in a 
relatively short period of time.  This observation suggests that it is 
possible for stronger bonds of loyalty to the state to emerge in a short 
period of time, and that the Stop Snitching norm can be eradicated 
almost as quickly as it emerged. 
Taken as a whole, it is clear that community-policing tactics aimed 
specifically at increasing witness cooperation in targeted communities 
can succeed.  To the extent police officers are serious about fostering 
a greater sense of loyalty and increased witness cooperation from 
within poor, black communities, they would be best served by 
adopting these tactics. 
CONCLUSION 
Stop Snitching has been misunderstood as either inexplicable 
human behavior or evidence of widespread ethical decay.  The reality 
is that it is best understood as a manifestation of a widespread 
privileging of community loyalty over loyalty to the state.  For some 
members of the poor, black communities that have been ravaged by 
mass incarceration, the decision not to report crimes or cooperate with 
 
220 Id. at 1537. 
221 Id. 
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police investigations arises out of an understanding that facilitating 
the imprisonment of a community member can hurt rather than help 
the community.  For others, it is their antagonism toward the police, 
whom they view as hostile, disrespectful interlopers, that drives their 
decision not to snitch.  In both cases, it is clear that for these 
witnesses loyalty to the community takes primacy over loyalty to the 
state. 
When loyalties conflict, one must necessarily privilege one loyalty 
over another.  Resolving conflicts of loyalty is always a challenge, 
and choosing which of two conflicting loyalties to privilege is both 
highly individualized and situational.  Just as deciding whether to tell 
on a classmate, fellow officer, or workplace colleague can often prove 
vexing, so can deciding whether to report the crimes of fellow 
community members.  In each of the realms discussed in this Article, 
there is a pronounced norm in favor of privileging loyalty to one’s 
immediate peer group and its members over loyalty to higher 
principles or more remote institutions.  In this vein, Stop Snitching—
the privileging of community loyalty over loyalty to the state—is 
neither exceptional nor unique in how it resolves an ethical conflict. 
Nonetheless, one can acknowledge that from a societal standpoint, 
widespread noncooperation with police is a behavior that should be 
curtailed and, ideally, eliminated.  Key in doing so is recognizing the 
root cause of Stop Snitching’s prevalence—weak loyalty bonds 
between police officers and the communities in which Stop Snitching 
is most prominent.  Once this cause is recognized, it becomes clear 
that Stop Snitching can be eliminated only through efforts aimed at 
strengthening these bonds.  Experiments in community policing over 
the past three decades have shown that community attitudes toward 
police officers can change pervasively in a short period of time.  
Borrowing tactics from community policing aimed at fostering mutual 
trust between police and community members is therefore the best 
approach to eliminating Stop Snitching, for trust is the first step 
toward creating stronger bonds of loyalty.  There is reason to believe 
that if done properly such efforts would be successful and that Stop 
Snitching could be a distant memory in a few years’ time. 
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